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PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN
ISAIAH'S BRAVE NEW WORLD
Jonathan K. Stubbs*
I. PROLOGUE
WRITER: As a concerned human being, the present state of
human affairs bothers me. I am convinced that unless we stop
choosing war and choose another way of resolving our conflicts,
we will eventually blow ourselves to "smithereens." I am con-
vinced that unless we take care of our environment, we will
choke ourselves to death on our own filth. I am concerned ....
READER: Yeah, I got the picture, you are concerned. But what
can you do about it? What can I do about it?
WRITER: We can look around ourselves and see what resources
exist to deal with our problems.
READER: You mean money?
WRITER: Not necessarily. I mean that we as human beings are
empowered to choose between good and evil, better and worse,
life and death, and that we can choose life. In fact, there are
resources in well known places. Resources exist in law, philoso-
phy, spirituality, in you and in me.
READER: I am listening, but fading fast.
WRITER: Hold on a bit and let me bend your ear. Sit back,
relax, and give me a "hear."
Let me tell you a story. It is a story that moves between law
and religion, between international relations and moral philoso-
phy, between life and death, between you and me, and all man-
ner of humanity.
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We invite an "old one" to help us tell the story. You may
know him from Sabbath and Sunday school, from hearing the
rabbi or preacher speak of him. This is, in part, a story about
Isaiah, an eighth century B.C.E. prophet/priest of the Southern
Kingdom of Israel. Twenty-seven hundred years ago Isaiah's
world was in many ways like ours - plagued by war, and op-
pression of the weak by the strong, and driven by fear rather
than faith.
READER: Are you going to get preachy on me?
WRITER: It depends on what you call preachy. I am just trying
to make a point by drawing on religious material.
READER: Sounds different. But go on. Just keep your preach-
ing to a minimum. Remember your audience.
WRITER: I am glad that you mentioned the audience. We are
considering a dilemma involving protecting human life. Accord-
ingly, my audience includes anyone who is willing and able to
read and think about these ideas. Protecting human life con-
cerns people inside and outside the legal community. In these
circumstances, I do not wish to get hung up on the "preaching"
issue.
In short, Isaiah addressed members of the royal court of the
Southern Kingdom and contended that they had lost their way
socially, politically and spiritually. Socially, they oppressed the
poor;' politically, they sought military alliances with undepend-
able partners; 2 and spiritually, they turned from God.3 Isaiah in-
sisted that they sought material greed in dealing with the lower
social classes and glory in their foreign relations.4 Subsequently,
Judah's military alliances failed. The nation became an Assyrian
vassal state, and finally its sovereignty was totally destroyed. 5
READER: So, Judah was overrun. That was then; this is now.
So what?
WRITER: So, consider learning from history. So, consider bring-
ing the secular and spiritual insights together. Important simi-




4. These themes are developed in more detail in Jonathan K. Stubbs, Reflections on
Isaiah's Brave New World (May 22, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
5. See 5 INTERPRETER'S BmLE 161-62, 393-97 (1956), for an overview of the historical
situation affecting the Middle East generally, and Judah, specifically. See also 1 INTER-
NATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY (ISAIAH) IXViii-lxxxi (1912).
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READER: What do you mean?
WRITER: For instance, despite the talk of a "Iew world order,"
billions of dollars in arms continue to pour into volatile regions
like the Middle East.6 Like Isaiah's hearers, we have not yet
moved beyond relying upon military alliances and the power of
armed violence to "right wrongs." Indeed, more alliances are be-
ing created in that region, and prospects are that they will be
"armed to the teeth."
As if it were not enough, the unsettled situation in the frag-
ile Commonwealth of Independent States causes concern. This
concern is heightened by the existence of a vast nuclear arsenal,
ethnic and religious strife, economic turmoil, and a weak "demo-
cratic" political infrastructure. The potential for "grave" conse-
quences is sobering.
All of this is occurring in the context of "firepower" spread
around the globe sufficient to annihilate humanity. Such fire-
power is also under the conirol, in many circumstances, of un-
stable governments.7
In addition, we are witnessing increasing disparities in
wealth inequality in many parts of the world, including the
United States.8 The current economic downturn, and the pre-
6. According to James Adams, the Defense Correspondent and Associate Editor of
the Sunday Times of London, although the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union may be drawing to a close, a new arms race, among developing nations and
with a growing black market, is just beginning. He asserts that ideological differences
between the United States and the former Soviet Union helped to establish an arms race
of unprecedented proportions." As a result, Europe became the:
most militarized piece of territory that the world has ever seen . . .. [I]n the
course of that militarisation, whole families of weapons have been designed
that are more powerful, more precise and kill more people than ever. At the
highest level there are enough nuclear missiles to wipe out the world's popula-
tion several times over, and at the bottom end there is enough conventional
artillery to destroy Europe's industrial base in a matter of days. For every
weapon that entered the Warsaw Pact or NATO inventories, a gun or missile
left those inventories and was sold to other countries in Africa, Asia, or Central
and South America. The arms race in the industrialised nations thus created a
second arms race in the developing world, . . . and unless new and effective
enforcement regimes are introduced, armies in the west and east will be faced
with large Third World forces of almost equal firepower.
JAMES ADAMS, ENGINES OF WAR-MERCHANTS OF DEATH AND THE NEw ARMs RACE 269-76
(1990).
7. See, e.g., Iraq.
8. See, e.g., RAvI BATRA, SURVIVING THE GREAT DEPRESSION OF 1990 (1988). Among
other things, Batra argues that in the United States wealth is being accumulated in
fewer hands, human greed among the materially wealthy is accelerating, and many in-
dustries are unproductive. Id. at 213-57. These circumstances coupled with over-ex-
tended credit institutions help constitute a prescription for economic disaster in the
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dictable social unrest and repression likely to flow from a pro-
longed recession (depression?) do not paint an encouraging
pictureY
In short, at the dawning of a new century and a new mil-
lenium, human life, individually and collectively, remains preca-
rious. In fact, after thousands of years of human history and
millions of deaths through homicide and war, one is "tempted"
to consider an old theological idea - "repentance."
READER: There you go preaching again. What is your problem?
WRITER: My problem is that there are too many people dead
and dying. There are too many people in pain, lost and con-
fused. Stated simply, perhaps as human beings we should con-
sider a change of heart; such a change can (must!) lead to a
change of behavior.
READER: But what does this have to do with law? I have had
more than I thought I could take of religion and moralizing.
How about law?
WRITER: Law? Have you heard of Professor H.L.A. Hart?
READER: Why, yes! But of course! Professor Hart is one of the
leading twentieth century legal thinkers. I quite enjoyed reading
western economies - especially the United States.
Furthermore, political economist and Harvard professor Robert Reich notes the
trend toward inequality in his most recent book, The Work of Nations. He points out
that
[b]etween 1977 and 1990 the average income of the poorest fifth of Americans
declined by about five percent (5%), while the richest fifth became about nine
percent (9%) wealthier. During these years, the average income of the poorest
fifth of American families declined by about seven percent (7%), while the
average income of the richest fifth of American families increased about fifteen
percent (15%). That left the poorest fifth of Americans in 1990 with 3.7 per-
cent of the nation's total income, down from 5.5 percent twenty years before -
the lowest portion they have received since 1954. And it left the richest fifth
with a bit over half of the nation's income - the highest portion ever recorded
by the top twenty percent (20%). The top five percent (5%) commanded
twenty-six percent (26%) of the nation's total income, another record.
ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS - PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sT CENTURY CAPI-
TALISM 197 (1991).
Among Blacks, whose earnings at all levels continued to trail whites, the gap is
wider still. Between 1978 and 1988, the average income of the lowest fifth of
black families declined by 24 percent, while that of the top five percent (5%)
increased by almost as much. By the end of the 1980's, the top five percent
(5%) of black families received forty-seven percent (47%) of total black in-
come, compared with forty-two point nine percent (42.9%) of total white in-
come received by the top five percent (5%) of white families.
Id. at 197 n.2.
9. WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS 139-41, 163-64 (1963).
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his book, The Concept of Law.10 If I may say so, what does Hart
have to do with it?
WRITER: Having read The Concept of Law, you will remember
that one of the important contributions of that work was Hart's
notion that law involves a system of rules. There are primary
rules which revolve around individuals' obligation to behave or
refrain from behaving in certain ways. And there are secondary
rules that determine how the primary rules may be created, al-
tered, and abolished.
READER: Yes, and there are also the "infamous" rules of recog-
nition. Among other things, they give actors within the legal sys-
tem a means of identifying valid rules.11
WRITER: Yes, I was coming to that. You beat me to the punch.
Hart also argued that actors such as lawyers, judges, and many
ordinary people within more advanced legal systems have an
"internal point of view." They recognize that rules exist. They
also perceive the existence of the rules as reasons for applying
their "social pressure" to enhance obedience to the rules.1" In
contrast, there would be some individuals who obeyed the law
primarily because of fear of governmental reprisals - for exam-
ple, imprisonment. Others would do so primarily because they
believed it was right.1
READER: I am with you. So what's the point?
WRITER: The point is that what is in an individual's heart
helps determine the effectiveness of law. 4
READER: What does this have to do with all of the life affect-
ing issues that you raised earlier like war, environmental dese-
cration, famine...
WRITER: As usual, you are at least two steps ahead of me. My
point was that over the past thirty years since the publication of
10. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
11. Id. at 92-93.
12. Id. at 88.
13. Id.
14. For example, people file their taxes on April 15. Some do so because they know
that failure to file can lead to unpleasantness from their beloved Uncle Sam. Others file
for that reason (fear!) and because they recognize a civic obligation to contribute finan-
cially to the government that attempts to furnish collective defense and human services.
Yet others, for various reasons, fail to file. They may disagree with governmental policy,
or hope that they will not get caught, or are afraid that they will owe more money than
they can pay and so "put it off" indefinitely. Nevertheless, even you would agree (I sus-
pect) that if individuals embraced the Internal Revenue Code's filing requirement from
an "internal point of view," compliance would go up. In other words, people would see
filing as an appropriate legal requirement.
1992]
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Professor Hart's book, international law has evolved dramati-
cally. Now international law has begun to look increasingly like
municipal or national law.
READER: How's that? The United Nations vaguely resembles a
legislature, the International Court of Justice has serious juris-
dictional limitations, and despite recent events in the Persian
Gulf there is no "global police force."
WRITER: I did not say that there exists a fully evolved system
of international law. Rather, in light of Hart's concept of law
involving a system of rules, the international system has devel-
oped tremendously. In the human rights area alone, there are
numerous multilateral treaties. They can be viewed as contain-
ing both primary and secondary rules. Regarding the primary
rules, the treaties say what are state obligations and individual
rights and how those obligations and rights are to be respected.
In addition, the fact of the treaties having, in some instances,
widespread support gives them more weight.
READER: For example?
WRITER: For example, the Chilean Government's (alleged)
breach of various human rights obligations under the Interna-
tional. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sparked tremen-
dous international "social pressure" to remedy the breaches. 15
READER: I wonder about "international 'social pressure.'" Just
how effective is it?
WRITER: It depends upon the circumstances. Empirical proof,
if that is what you want, would be more difficult to produce,
since tyrants rarely say that they "caved in" to international
public opinion. Nevertheless, there seems to be a ready analogy
between individual behavior and state behavior in response to
"peer pressure." How far the analogy reflects reality is, perhaps,
another matter.
READER: Explain and defend the contention that individuals
and states behave similarly.
WRITER: The clarification and resolution of that issue raises
broad concerns beyond the scope of our present conversation.
READER: How about the secondary rules? Those rules govern,
among other things, the creation, modification, and abolition of
the primary rules.
WRITER: Regarding secondary rules, treaties have internal pro-
15. See, e.g., [1979-1980] 2 Y.B. of the Hum. Rts. Comm. 470-476, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
2/Add.1 (1989) [hereinafter YEARBOOK (79-80)].
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visions that help determine how they may be altered, abolished,
and enforced. For example, the rule(s) of recognition may in-
clude treaty provisions establishing the treaty's effective starting
date such that the treaty will go into force when a certain num-
ber of signatories have ratified the document.
READER: Can you speed this up?
WRITER: I was simply sharing with you some thoughts about
the general area with which we are dealing - that dynamic,
evolving field of international law! Putting things in context...
However, I take it you are hinting at the earlier question of re-
ponses to current human dilemmas - specifically, if I may be so
bold, how to help save human lives. Let me tell you about an
international covenant, which is part of what some people call
the International Bill of Rights. The International Bill of Rights
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
READER: I have heard something about international human
rights treaties. They ring a distant bell in my consciousness.
WRITER: Well, give me a few minutes to chime it a bit louder. I
will give an historical overview, and then focus on the ICCPR'S
right to life provision.
The Allied Powers created the United Nations immediately
following one of the greatest catastrophies in human history,
World War II. The United Nations Charter (Charter) went into
force on October 24, 1945.16
The United Nations is an international body of nation
states. The United Nations aspires to: "save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war ... to reaffirm faith in fundamen-
tal human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women ...."17
Article 1 (3) of the Charter specifically provides that one of
the purposes of the United Nations is to "achieve international
cooperation ... in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . ..."
The Charter created the Economic and Social Council
16. U.N. CHARTER cited in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1-20 (Louis B.
Sohn ed., 2d ed. 1968.).
17. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
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(ECOSOC) to "make or initiate studies and reports with respect
to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health,
and related matters .... 18 The recipients of such reports in-
clude the General Assembly, the Members of the United Na-
tions, and specialized agencies.19
The Charter also required ECOSOC to create a number of
commissions, including one on human rights. On February 16,
1946, only a few months after its own inception, ECOSOC cre-
ated the United Nations Human Rights Commission.2"
The General Assembly had instructed ECOSOC to have the
Human Rights Commission draft an International Bill of Rights.
After some preliminary organizational discussions, the Human
Rights Commission decided that the international bill of rights
should include at least three documents: a declaration of human
rights, a covenant on international human rights, and "measures
of implementation."'"
The declaration of human rights would state the interna-
tional norms to which nations should aspire in their domestic
jurisprudence. The covenant would constitute a binding agree-
ment among nations to adhere to agreed human rights
standards.22
The Human Rights Commission moved forward relatively
quickly on drafting the declaration and the covenant.23
The Human Rights Commission sought input from govern-
ments, non-governmental organizations, and United Nations af-
filiated agencies.24 Significant disagreements emerged regarding
what the covenant on human rights should include.25
READER: Disagreements? What kinds of disagreements?
WRITER: Some states were of the opinion that the covenant
should focus on protecting individual civil and political rights
from state infringement.26 Other states felt such protections
18. Id. art. 62.
19. Id.
20. U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 28, at 2, U.N. Doe. A/2929 (1955)
[hereinafter U.N. Doec. A/2929].
21. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 37 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) [hereinafter IN-
TERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS]; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2.
22. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 38.
23. Less than two years after its creation, the Human Rights Committee had drafted
and circulated for comment a proposed declaration of human rights and a human rights
covenant. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2.
24. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2-6.
25. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 38-43.
26. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41.
[Vol. XVII':2
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would infringe upon national sovereignty. They contended that
the covenant should focus on the protection of social and eco-
nomic rights (e.g., the right to work, education, subsistence).
These disagreements made it impossible for the Human Rights
Commission to quickly complete a draft on the proposed human
rights covenant.
However, the Human Rights Commission forwarded the
declaration on human rights to ECOSOC which in turn sent it to
the General Assembly for discussion and debate.28 On December
10, 1948, the General Assembly unanimously adopted what has
come to be known as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Universal Declaration). e
READER: You have piqued my curiousity. Tell me more about
its provisions.
WRITER: The Universal Declaration proclaims the existence of
a number of fundamental human rights. For example, "everyone
has the right to life, liberty and the security of person;"30 "free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion;"'1 and a "right to a
standard of living adequate for" an individual's "health and
well-being," as well as that of her family.32 The Universal Decla-
ration states that member nations have pledged to respect these
rights." It was originally contemplated that the Universal Decla-
ration would simply provide aspirational guidance for nations;
the covenant would spell out the more obligatory details.' 4
READER: You said that it was contemplated that the Universal
Declaration would provide aspirational guidance. That suggests
something else happened.
WRITER: In some respects "something else" (unexpected) did
happen. In part because of Cold War tensions, ideological divi-
sions, and the Korean conflict, the Human Rights Commission
was not able to complete work on the draft human rights cove-
nant until 1954. That was nearly eight years after the creation of
the Commission.' 5 And it was approximately six years following
27. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41-43.
28. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2-3.
29. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 38.
30. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 3 (1948).
31. Id. art. 18.
32. Id. art. 25.
33. Id. pmbl.
34. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 38-39.
35. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 39-43. In the meantime, na-
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the passage of the Universal Declaration. In fact, rather than
one document as originally contemplated, the Human Rights
Commission wound up drafting two. The General Assembly de-
cided that it was better to have two human rights covenants for
pragmatic reasons and arguably for doctrinal ones. States from
the former "Eastern bloc" and the developing nations seemed
more supportive of a covenant protecting economic, social and
cultural rights. The developed western democracies were more
concerned about first affording protections for civil and political
rights."
READER: Sounds familiar. What happened? Could they work
something out?
WRITER: They tried the art of compromise. The compromises
involved trying to emphasize the unity of the two covenants'
purposes. Together, the covenants furnish comprehensive
human rights protection. To emphasize unity, the drafters wrote
the documents with overlapping, and in some cases identical
provisions. The covenants were also to be submitted simulta-
neously for ratification.-8 In addition, some thought it easier to
obtain ratification of two separate documents rather than one all
encompassing one.
The report of the Human Rights Commission was for-
warded by ECOSOC to the General Assembly, which in turn for-
warded it to the General Assembly's own Third Committee."
The General Assembly mandated that its Third Committee (So-
cial, Humanitarian, and Cultural) consider the two covenants at
the next General Assembly session "article by article. '40
The Third Committee wrestled with concerns similar to
those which confronted the Human Rights Commission. Ideol-
ogy, historical circumstances, decolonization, and the desire to
work towards consenus all contributed to an extended revision
stage. In fact, the Third Committee worked on the two cove-
nants for twelve years! It took that long to reach sufficient agree-
ment to forward the covenants to the General Assembly for
tions of war-ravaged Europe had moved forward and adopted the European Convention
on Human Rights four years earlier. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 40.
36. INTERNATIONAL BIL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41.
37. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 43; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra
note 20, at 14.
38. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 5.
39. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 5-6.




READER: Twelve years! Are you serious?
WRITER: I am. In fact, on December 16, 1966, over twenty
years after the United Nations created the Human Rights Com-
mission to draft an international bill of rights, the General As-
sembly passed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).42  The General Assembly simultaneously
adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.43
The United Nations laid the covenants before the nations of
the world to ratify."
4
The scope of the ICCPR is broad. Among other rights, it
recognizes the right of "[a]ll peoples" to self-determination, 45
the "inherent right to life,"'46 the "right to liberty and security of
person,' 4 7 "the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion,"48 and equal protection of the law.49
During the first ten years following the passage of the
ICCPR, nations seemed to take a cautious approach to ratifying
or acceding to its provisions. Czechoslavakia was the thirty-fifth
nation to ratify the covenant and on March 23, 1976, the ICCPR
took effect vig-a-vi§ the states that had ratified it.
50
Since 1976, approximately sixty additional nations have rat-
ified the ICCPR, so that now nearly a hundred members of the
United Nations are bound by its provisions. 1
READER: That is a lot of countries. I bet the western democra-
cies are leading the way.
WRITER: Yes and no. In fact, the vast majority of states with
41. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 54-66.
42. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 64.
43. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 64.
44. As a practical matter, during the nearly 20 year period between the proclama-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the passage of the covenants, the
Universal Declaration had, in effect, achieved the status of customary international
human rights law. U.N. agencies and other international entities looked to the Universal
Declaration for guidance in determining what constituted human rights. INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 38.
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
46. Id. art. 6.
47. Id. art. 9.
48. Id. art. 18.
49. Id. art. 26.
50. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 66.
51. U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF Dec. 31, 1989, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG!
SER.E/8, U.N. Sales No. E.90.V.6 (1990) [hereinafter U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
1992] 425
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XVIII:2
democratic governments have ratified or acceded to the ICCPR,
although some of them have done so with reservations and un-
derstandings. States which have adopted the ICCPR include the
United Kingdom, 2 the Federal Republic of Germany,
5 3 France,54
Japan,5 5 and India."
Until recently, the United States was one of the few leading
democracies in the world which had neither ratified nor acceded
to the ICCPR. However, on June 8, 1992, the United States offi-
cially ratified the ICCPR 57 Having passed the treaty, however,
the United States adopted a number of understandings and res-
ervations. Arguably, those reservations and understandings es-
sentially preclude the treaty from having any substantial impact
upon the domestic jurisprudence of the United States.5 8
The Bush proposals could help the United States join the
nations from a broad "spectrum" of the world community which
have adopted the ICCPR. Through their governments, many of
the people of the world have formally recognized and bound
themselves to follow the ICCPR in their domestic jurisprudence.
In that sense, the world community is witnessing the strengthen-
ing of customary human rights law.
READER: What do you mean by "customary human rights
52. Id. at 134. The United Kingdom signed the ICCPR on September 16, 1968 and
ratified it on May 20, 1976. Id.
53. Id. (The Federal Republic of Germany signed the ICCPR on October 9, 1968
and ratified it on December 17, 1973).
54. Id. (France acceded to the provisions of the ICCPR on November 4, 1980).
55. Id. (Japan signed the ICCPR on May 30, 1978 and ratified it on June 21, 1979).
56. Id. (India, the world's largest democracy, acceded to the provisions of the
ICCPR on April 10, 1979).
57. The treaty went into force September 8, 1992. See U.N. MULTILATERAL TREA.
TIES, Supp., U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/10 (1992).
58. For example, the United States adopted a reservation regarding Article 6 of the
ICCPR as follows:
[T]he United States reserves the right, subject to its constitutional constraints,
to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman)
duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capi-
tal punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age.
Id. at 2.
With such reservations, one may argue that the treaty's effect could be negligible; a
cynic might say "mere window dressing." Nevertheless, a full discussion of the reserva-
tions and understandings, effecting the treaty falls outside the scope of this essay. For a
more detailed discussion of "understandings and reservations" see Jonathan K. Stubbs,
The Right to Counsel: Establishing Judgement within the 'International Gate' - Espe-
cially in America 68 (May 22, 1979) (unpublished LL.M. thesis on file with the Univer-
sity of Richmond Faculty Offices).
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law"? I have heard of custom and usage in other fields involving
commercial transactions for instance.59
WRITER: By customary human rights law, I simply mean that
it has become (and is increasingly becoming) the international
standard or norm to accord human beings rights consistent with
widely ratified human rights documents. Such documents in-
clude the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide (Genocide Convention)."
During the legislative drafting process, the Third Commit-
tee revised the Human Rights Commission's proposed cove-
nants. The Third Committee expanded the proposed Human
Rights Committee from nine to eighteen members; and made it
primarily responsible for the implementation of the ICCPR.*
The Human Rights Committee consists of representatives from
nations that have ratified the ICCPR 2 Geographical, develop-
mental, cultural, religious and other types of representation have
been encouraged.63
The ICCPR requires ratifying states to submit reports on
human rights compliance, to the Human Rights Committee.
6 4
The Committee has the authority to request reports from states
which ratified the ICCPR, request follow-up reports, and make
"general comments. '65 Nations put forth their best evidentiary
"foot." Good faith reporting seems presumed. As I mentioned
before, in at least one instance, however, the Committee has re-
jected self-serving statements of a reporting state and noted
facts (outside the "record"). In that case, the Committee ac-
cepted facts stated in United Nations resolutions and findings. "
59. Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, Law of International Commercial Trans-
actions (Lex mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978).
60. For example, over a hundred nations have signed or ratified the following con-
ventions: The Genocide Convention, see U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 51, at
97-105; The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination; U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 51, at 106-23; and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; U.N. MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, supra note 51, at 170-84.
61. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 61, 335.
62. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 61, 335.
63. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 338.
64. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 61; ICCPR, supra note 45, art.
40.
65. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 350.
66. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 347-48 (discussing the flagrant
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READER: Interesting once you got going. Tell me more and I
won't bother you..
WRITER: It's not a "bother." I like sharing this information.
For example, take Article 41 of the ICCPR. That article allows
ratifying states to recognize the competence of the Human
Rights Committee to receive complaints involving alleged
human rights violations. Such complaints would be made by
other ratifying states.6 7 Under Article 41, one state can bring a
complaint against another state only if both states have ac-
knowledged the competency of the Human Rights Committee to
receive such complaints.6
READER: Why did they do that?
WRITER: In part, because it makes sense for parties to an in-
ternational compact to have reciprocal means of enforcing the
agreement. They can "keep each other honest." Nevertheless,
relatively few states have "declared" under Article 41.69 Accord-
ingly, the state to state complaint procedure has not been per-
ceived as a particularly strong enforcement mechanism.70
READER: So much for international honesty.
WRITER: Many states take their international obligations seri-
ously and consider well before they decide to bind themselves.
In addition, at the time of the passage of the ICCPR, the
General Assembly also passed an Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR. The Optional Protocol permits individuals in states who
ratify the Protocol to bring individual human rights complaints.
The individual's complaints can be brought against the state in
which the individual resides. The "accused" state must have rat-
ified the Protocol.
71
human rights violations associated with former government administrations in Chile).
67. The process basically involves one state claiming that another state is violating
the provisions of the ICCPR. The complaining state "may" inform the respondent state,
in writing, about the alleged violations. ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 41(1)(a). Unless the
two states themselves can amicably resolve the situation, either state may bring the mat-
ter before the Human Rights Committee. ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 41(1)(b).
Except in specified circumstances, the Human Rights Committee requires that the
victims of the alleged human rights violations exhaust all domestic remedies. ICCPR,
supra note 45, art. 41(1)(c). The Committee can use its good offices to attempt reconcili-
ation, request further information, and issue a report. ICCPR, supra note 45, art.
41(1)(e)-(h). In the event that the matter is not resolved to the parties' satisfaction, with
the parties' consent the Committee may also refer the matter to an ad hoc conciliation
Commission. ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 42(a)
68. ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 41(1).
69. U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 51, at 135-47.
70. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 353.
71. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 353.
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Presently, approximately fifty nations have agreed to allow
individual complaints from their citizens to be made to the
Human Rights Committee. 2 Only one permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council has agreed to the Optional
Protocol.
73
Regarding implementation, the Committee seems to have,
in large part, a fact-gathering role. To a limited extent, it also
has a concilitory role. Regretably, after filing a report, a state
which has not met its obligations under the ICCPR is not re-
quired to respond to the Committee's general comments; it may
ignore them. 4 In practice, this does not appear to be the pat-
tern.75 Further, through periodic follow-up reports at five year
intervals, the Committee can monitor, on a limited basis, the
progress of states which have ratified the ICCPR.
In addition, in more recent years the Committee has issued
general comments interpreting various provisions of the ICCPR.
We will have an occasion to talk more about that later when we
discuss Article 6, the right to life provision.
As aipractical matter, with more nations ratifying or acced-
ing to the ICCPR, the light of international public opinion may
well create compelling "moral persuasion." This moral force may
in part substitute for the lack of other sanctions in this area of
international law. 6
READER: You mentioned Article 6 of the international cove-
nant. What is it?
WRITER: Article 6 is a legal provision reflecting an interna-
tional attempt to protect human life in the aftermath of the Sec-
ond World War. It states:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
72. U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 51, at 162.
73. U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 51, at 162 (France).
74. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 351; see Professor A.H. Rob-
ertson's incisive comments in INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 350-51.
75. Thus, the Committee has received supplementary reports from a number of
states including Chile, see, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 11-18, U.N. Doc. A/
40/40 (1985); Venezuela, see id. at 27-31, and see [1979-1980] 2 Y.B. of the Hum. Rts.
Comm. 194-203, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.28 (1989).
76. Cf. HART, supra note 10, at 84-88.
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commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it
is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any
State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way
from the obligation assumed under the provisions of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek par-
don or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon, or com-
mutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes commit-
ted by persons below 18 years of age and shall not be carried
out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in the article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any state party to the
present covenant.
Since you like to understand things fully, allow me to fill you in
on some of the important legislative background regarding the
history of Article 6. In fact, pull your chair closer. After the leg-
islative background, I will give you a paragraph by paragraph
analysis of its provisions. Furthermore, I will outline the evolv-
ing interpretation of the meaning of the right to life as reflected
in reports of the entity primarily responsible for monitoring
compliance. That entity is the United Nations Human Rights
Committee. This may shed some light on statutory interpreta-
tion issues in the international context.
Shortly after its own creation, the United Nations Human
Rights Commission requested a drafting committee to prepare a
proposed international bill of rights. The Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) approved the request.7
The drafters' first session (June 9-25, 1947) began with sev-
eral proposed drafts "on the table.
'78
Regarding the right to life, the United Kingdom proposed
the following text: "It shall be unlawful to deprive any person of
77. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2.
78. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2. It is unlikely that anyone forsaw that it
would take nearly twenty years for agreement on various drafts to evolve to the point
that the General Assembly would have final texts upon which to vote. INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 38.
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his life save in the execution of the sentence of a court following
on his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law."
1 9
The Republic of Lebanon proposed an alternate text: "It
shall be unlawful to deprive any person, from the moment of
conception, of his live [sic] or bodily integrity, save in the execu-
tion of the sentence of a court following on his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law."80
The drafting committee considered the British and Leba-
nese drafts and forwarded its recommendations to the Human
Rights Commission. ' The Human Rights Commission directed
the drafts to its own "working group" on the human rights cove-
nant."2 The working group modified the drafting committee's
proposals. The working group transmitted the following pro-
posed text to the Human Rights Commission.
1. It shall be unlawful to deprive any person of his life save in
the execution of the sentence of a court following on his con-
viction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. It shall be unlawful to procure abortion except in a case in
which it is permitted by law and is done in good faith in order
to preserve the life of the woman, or on medical advice to pre-
vent the birth of a child of unsound mind to parents suffering
from mental disease, or in a case where the pregnancy is the
result of rape.83
The Human Rights Commission adopted the first paragraph
of the working group's proposed draft; it deleted the second par-
agraph involving abortion. 4 The Human Rights Commission
then sought responses from national governments.8 5
In light of the comments from governments, the drafting
committee met again and revised the proposed human rights
79. M.J. BossuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAvAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS 113 (1987) [hereinafter GUIDE].
80. Id.
81. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2-6.
82. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2.
83. GuIDE, supra note 79, at 114.
84. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 114. Early in the discussion of the parameters of the
right to life, members of the global community were concerned about whether that right
should extend to the unborn. See, proposal of Republic of Lebanon, GUIDE, supra note
79, at 113; and draft of the Human Rights Commission Working Party, GUIDE, supra
note 79, at 114. See also infra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
85. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 2.
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covenant.86 The drafters proposed the following one sentence
paragraph: "No one shall be deprived of his life save in the exe-
cution of the sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law."
87
The drafting committee appended a dozen possible excep-
tions to the revised one sentence draft. Most of the exceptions
were proposed by the United States and the Union Of South Af-
rica. The exceptions were attempts to justify homicides primar-
ily in military and police related affairs; and medical operations
or voluntary medical experiments.8
The drafting committee sent the revised, one-sentence draft
with the exceptions back to the Human Rights Commission."
READER: What did the Commission do with a one-sentence
draft and all of those exceptions?
WRITER: I thought you might be interested to know. Let's take
Article 6 paragraph by paragraph. That way we can see how the
right to life provision developed.
As your question implied, when the Human Rights Commis-
sion began reviewing the proposed human rights covenant, and
confronted the right to life article with a dozen possible amend-
ments, debate ensued. Some nations felt that the covenant
should state specifically the duties that nations undertook by
agreeing to the right to life article. Accordingly, they contended
that the exceptions to the article should be precisely outlined.90
Other nations felt that the emphasis ought to be on af-
firming the right and protection of life. Accordingly, any state-
ments that seemed to condone the taking of life ought to be
restricted. 1
In addition, some states argued that a long list of exceptions
would tend to convey the impression that the exceptions were
more important than the rule.2
86. The second session was held from May 3-21, 1948.
87. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 114.
88. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 114.
89. That is, "No one shall be deprived of his life save in the execution of the sen-
tence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law." GUIDE, supra note 79, at 114.
90. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 116. Nations expressing this type view included France,
the United Kingdom, and India. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 116; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra
note 20, at 29-30.
91. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 115; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 29.
92. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 117; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 29-30. Nations




During the course of the debate, a number of amendments
to the article were proposed. We will follow the debate taking
each paragraph "line by line" and "session by session."
READER: This sounds like too much detail.
WRITER: Bear with me. We are trying to understand the pa-
rameters of the right to life article. Accordingly, it makes sense
to thoroughly discuss its legislative history. That history has
been discussed with relative brevity elsewhere. 3 However,
frankly, the right to life is so important that a more comprehen-
sive treatment is warranted.
The first paragraph says: "Every human being has the in-
herent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
Let's focus on the first sentence: "Every human being has
the inherent right to life."
At the beginning of the fifth session of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission,94 the Commission inherited a one-
sentence text with twelve exceptions."" The Commission consid-
ered several proposed amendments to the Covenant's right to
life. 8
One proposed amendment by the United States provoked a
lawyerly debate. The debate involved whether paragraph one
should use the word "arbitrarily" or "intentionally."
READER: A debate about "arbitrarily" or "intentionally"?
Why?
WRITER: On a broader level, the debate involved how far
human life would be protected under the right to life article. Ac-
cordingly, some states preferred language to the effect that: "No
one shall be deprived of his life arbitrarily. 9 7 The reasons for
using the word "arbitrarily" indicated that the protection of the
right to life was not absolute.9 s Using "arbitrarily" would "obvi-
ate" the necessity of cataloguing a long list of exceptions to the
right to life.99
Critics of "arbitrarily" countered arguing that the word was
93. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 114-22.
94. May 9 - June 20, 1949. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 3.
95. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 114-15.
96. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 115. Nations suggesting amendments included the
United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Lebanon. See GUIDE,
supra note 79, at 115-17.
97. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121. (This position was advanced by the United States)
98. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 30.
99. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
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ambiguous and open to a number of interpretations.0 " The crit-
ics prevailed, temporarily, and the amendment of the United
States was defeated.10
READER: This was a temporary victory?
WRITER: Yes, we will explore that and the fate of "intention-
ally" in a moment. Let me continue with the legislative story.
The Republic of Chile offered a proposal that: "No one may
deprive another person of his life arbitrarily." The proposal was
adopted without the word "arbitrarily.'
0 2
The Commission forwarded this draft text and other sug-
gested amendments with supporting documents to governments
for comments. 03
At the next session of the Human Rights Commission, 1°
France proposed that the right to life article should be amended
to read as follows: "Human life is sacred. To take life shall be a
crime, save in the execution of a sentence of a court, or in self-
defence, or in the case of enforcement measures authorized by
the Charter."'1
05
The Republic of Lebanon suggested an amendment to the
French proposal. As amended, the French proposal would have
read: "Human life, from the moment of conception, is sacred. To
take life shall be a crirme, save in the execution of a sentence of a
court, or in self-defence, or in the case of enforcement measures
authorized by the Charter."'' 0
The French proposal as amended was not voted upon.107
The Human Rights Commission rejected the first sentence of
the original French proposal; namely, that "Human life is
sacred."
0 8
The Commission adopted the second sentence; that is: "To
take life shall be a crime save in the execution of a sentence of a
court, or in self-defence, or in the case of enforcement measures
100. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
101. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
102. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122. That is: "No one may deprive another person of
his life."
103. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 3.
104. The Commission met March 27 - May 19, 1950. U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note
20, at 3.
105. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 115.
106. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
107. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
108. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 115.
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authorized by the Charter."'' 0 The French amendment became
the foundation for what later evolved into paragraph two of Ar-
ticle 6.110
While meeting during its sixth session, the Human Rights
Commission rejected a proposal by India that stated: "Everyone
has the right to life.""' The Commission also refused to adopt a
more detailed British proposal. The British amendment would
have made it a "legitimate defense" for a public agent to kill a
person in a number of circumstances." 2
During the sixth session, the United States proposed an-
other article using "arbitrarily." The provision would have read:
"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." That amend-
ment was defeated."-3
In the aftermath of this vote, "intentionally" was suggested
as a substitute: "No one shall be deprived of his life intention-
ally."114 This amendment, suggested by the British, fared no
better; and was unceremoniously defeated.
115
Dissatisfaction was expressed with paragraph one as it then
read, namely: "No one shall be deprived of his life." That lan-
guage was rejected as well.
11.6
The Republic of Lebanon proposed an amendment stating:
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law."'" This par-
ticular provision attempted to underline the responsibilities of
nations to protect the lives of individuals." 8 Some states empha-
sized that the provision applied to state protection of individual
109. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 115.
110. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by
a competent court. See infra notes 139-92 and accompanying text.
111. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 115.
112. Such circumstances included defense of another, effecting a lawful arrest or
preventing an escape, quelling civil unrest, or preventing trespass to property which was
important to national security. The amendment would have required the public agent to
have been acting within her lawful authority and not to use any more force than "abso-
lutely necessary." GUIDE, supra note 79, at 118-19.
113. GumE, supra note 79, at 122. The vote was close: six to five with two
abstentions.
114. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
115. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.149 § 21 (1949).
116. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
117. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
118. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
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life from state interference." 9
Most states went further. They contended that the provi-
sion required state intervention to protect individual life from
private and state action.
-A number of other amendments were proposed during the
sixth session of the Human Rights Commission. Many of the
amendments were either withdrawn or not voted upon.120
READER: The fifth and sixth sessions seemed "active." What
noteworthy events followed?
WRITER: The eighth session of the Human Rights Commis-
sion 2  witnessed the Soviet Union offer a revised draft of para-
graph one as follows: "No one may be deprived of life. Every-
one's right to life shall be protected by law."' 22 The Soviet
proposal seemed to successfully navigate through the uncertain
"channels" of Commission concerns, avoiding the rocky shoals of
"arbitrarily" and "intentionally." It also seemed to expand the
scope of the Lebanese proposal that had been adopted in the
sixth session - that is: "Everyone's right to life shall be pro-
tected by law.'
23
READER: Is that not redundant? The Soviet proposal said, "No
one may be deprived of life," and that "[e]veryone's right to life
shall be protecied by law.' 24 If everyone's life is protected by
law, no one may be deprived of life.
WRITER: That is one possible interpretation. On the other
hand, the Soviet proposal may have simply emphasized that the
state must protect life and not deprive or allow others to deprive
individuals of their lives.
25
The United States and Chile proposed an amendment to
the first sentence of the Soviet provision. As amended, the para-
graph read: "No one [may] shall be arbitrarily deprived of HIS
life." The words in italics were added in the Chilean/American
amendment; the word in brackets deleted. 26
119. See, e.g., the position of the United States expressed in GUIDE, supra note 79,
at 120.
120. See GUIDE, supra note 79, at 117-19.
121. The eighth session met April 14 - June 14, 1952. U.N. Doc, A/2929, supra note
20, at 5.
122. GUmE, supra note 79, at 120.
123. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
124. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
125. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120. The Soviet draft passed by a vote of twelve to
four with two abstentions.
126. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
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It was argued, successfully this time, that "arbitrarily" had
been used in several provisions of the Universal Declaration; and
that "arbitrarily" meant illegally and unjustly.12 The proposed
amendment passed.
128
After over seven years of diligent effort, the Human Rights
Commission recommended to the General Assembly that the
first paragraph of Article 6 would have two sentences. They were
the following: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.M
29
The General Assembly referred the matter to the Third
Committee.
READER: When was that?
WRITER: That occurred during the General Assembly's 682nd
plenary meeting on September 20, 1957 - over ten years follow-
ing the Human Rights Commission's initial drafts.L30
When the Third Committee met during its twelfth session,
many of its members felt that the first paragraph of Article 6
should affirm every human being's right to life.' 3' To that end,
Colombia and Uruguay proposed to substitute for the existing
draft the following language: "Every human being has the inher-
ent right to life. The death penalty shall not be imposed on any
person."' 32
READER: Why?
WRITER: During the course of the debate, it was argued that
127. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122; U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 30.
128. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122. The vote was ten to five with three abstentions.
129. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 125.
130. See U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3764 (1957)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/3764].
131. Id. at 12, para. 112.
132. Id. at 10, para. 87; GUIDE, supra note 79, at 119. The Human Rights Commis-
sion's draft of Article 6 which was submitted to ECOSOC for General Assembly action
read as follows:
1. No one shall'be arbitrarily deprived of his life. Everyone's right to life shall
be protected by law.
2. In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of death may be im-
posed only as a penalty for the most serious crimes pursuant to the sentence of
a competent court and in accordance with law not contrary to the principles of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
3. Any one sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commuta-
tion of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death
may be granted in all cases.
4. Sentence of death shall not be carried out on a pregnant woman.
U.N. Doc. A/2929, supra note 20, at 29; U.N. Doc. 3764, supra note 130, at 10, para. 85.
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society did not confer the right to life upon individuals; rather
the right was inherent, and society was obliged to protect the
right. Accordingly, widespread support existed for the first sen-
tence of the Colombian/Uruguayan amendment, that is, "Every
human being has the inherent right to life."13
Despite widespread support for the amendment's first sen-
tence, the amendment as a whole failed by a substantial
margin.2
3 4
The Third Committee then voted separately on the state-
ment that "Every human being has the inherent right to life."
By a wide margin, this amended statement won acceptance. 38
We now turn to the second sentence of paragraph one:
"This right shall be protected by law."
The second sentence of Article 6's first paragraph13 8 had
somewhat "smoother sailing" than the first. As stated previ-
ously, the Commission's sixth session witnessed the Republic of
Lebanon proposal of the following language:
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law."'I3 The
Commission adopted this language by a vote of seven to four
with two abstentions.
3 8
The Soviet Union incorporated this language in its proposal
during the eighth session of the Commission. The Soviet spon-
sored provision said: "No one may be deprived of his life. Every-
one's right to life shall be protected by law."' 39 The Human
Rights Commission did not amend the second sentence of Arti-
cle 6: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law." The
Commission submitted this portion of Article 6 directly to the
General Assembly.
133. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 119.
134. Fifty-one states voted to reject the proposed amendment; nine voted to accept
it and twelve abstained. See GUIDE, supra note 79, at 119. The provision prohibiting
capital punishment seemed the undoing of the Colombian/Urug,,ayan amendment.
135. Sixty-five votes were recorded in favor of the statement with only three con-
trary and four abstentions. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 119.
136. That is, "This right shall be protected by law." GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
137. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120; see supra note 129 and accompanying text. Pro-
ponents of this text stressed that the language was intended to underscore nations' obli-
gation to protect life. Some states, like the United States of America, contended that a
nation's obligation to protect the right to life only extended to situations which involved
unwarranted state action. See supra note 117. Most states contended, however, that the
duty of national governments included protecting individuals' lives from public entities
and private individuals. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
138. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.




After the General Assembly forwarded the text to the Third
Committee, a number of states proposed an amendment to the
first paragraph of Article 6. The substituted text would have
read as follows: "The right to life is inherent in the human per-
son. From the moment of conception, this right shall be pro-
tected by law."'140
Nations favoring amending the article argued that it was
"logical" to protect human life from its beginning.14' In addition,
they argued that the draft Article 6 already provided for the
protection of unborn children of mothers sentenced to capital
punishment. Such protection existed in what was then para-
graph four of Article 6. In relevant part, paragraph four of Arti-
cle 6 read as follows: "Sentence of death shall not be carried out
on a pregnant woman.'
14 2
A number of objections were raised to this amendment that
would have protected life "from the moment of conception." For
example, a perception existed that it was impossible to deter-
mine the moment of conception; accordingly, a state would not
be able to ascertain the time from which it was responsible for
protecting the lives of the unborn.14 3 In addition, competing
rights and duties of medical professionals existed. Moreover, na-
tions applied differing principles in their legislation dealing with
abortion. That fact encouraged some nations to oppose this
amendment.
44
The Third Committee decided to first vote on the last sen-
tence of the proposed amendment, that is: "From the moment of
conception, this right shall be protected by law."145 The Com-
mittee rejected the sentence.
146
The Committee then decided to vote on the last clause of
the rejected sentence, namely: "This right shall be protected by
law." The amended provision was adopted without dissent, and
with only one abstention.
47
140. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121. The countries proposing the amendment were
Belgium, Morocco, Brazil, Mexico, and El Salvador. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at
11, para. 97.
141. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121.
142. U.N. Doc. 3764, supra note 130, at 10, para. 85.
143. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121.
144. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
145. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121.
146. The voting results were 31 opposed, 20 in favor and 17 abstentions. GUIDE,
supra note 79, at 121.
147. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121.
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READER: So the second sentence of paragraph one "started"
stating "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law."; and
ended saying, "This right shall be protected by law."
WRITER: That is correct. We now turn to the last sentence in
paragraph one: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life."
The Human Rights Commission adopted the italicized text
during its eighth session. 148 The text was submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly which forwarded it to the Third Committee. We
have previously considered the "roller coaster" legislative his-
tory of the word "arbitrarily" in paragraph one. 14 Predictably
during the debate, the inglorious history of arbitrarily was re-
counted in some detail; and arguments renewed about its vague-
ness and imprecision. Some states (again) took the position that
"arbitrarily" meant "illegally," others that it meant "unjustly,"
and yet others argued that it meant both.150
In the Committee, some states argued that "arbitrarily"
meant that a state could not end a person's life except "in accor-
dance with law."'' Some representatives argued that the correct
understanding of "arbitrarily" was that it meant "fixed or done
capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate determining prin-
ciple; depending on the will alone; tyrannical; despotic; without
cause upon law; not governed by any fixed rule or standard.'
' 2
In addition, it was argued that "arbitrarily" meant "without due
process of law."'' 3 Accordingly, the right to a fair trial and free-
dom from false arrest were implicated.
5 4
The Third Committee voted'55 upon this last sentence" by
roll call at-Syria's request. 5 7 The Third Committee adopted the
provision by a wide margin."'
148. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
149. See supra notes 97-127 and accompanying text.
150. See U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 17, para. 114.
151. See U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 12.
152. See U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 12.
153. See U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 12; GUIDE, supra note 79, at 124.
154. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 124.
155. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 123.
156. That is, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
157. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 123.
158. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 123. The vote was forty-six to twelve with fourteen
abstentions. A Costa Rican amendment would have replaced Article 6 with a brief rela-
tively open ended provision reading as follows: "Every human being shall have the ina-
lienable right to his life and to the security of his person." That amendment was over-
whelmingly defeated. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 123. Similarly, the Third Committee
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So much for paragraph one. We now shift attention to the
second paragraph of Article 6:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.
Early in developing Article 6, the Human Rights Commis-
sion proposed a single sentence provision, namely: "No one shall
be deprived of his life save in the execution of the sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law."' 9 Remember that this provision had twelve
specific exceptions appended to it and that much debate en-
sued.1 60 Part of the reason for the debate was that this state-
ment contemplated the existence of capital punishment. The
fact of a human being's execution following a criminal conviction
concerned some nations. They were especially alarmed that a
document that purported to protect human lives would seem to
sanction capital punishment.1 6' In fact some states were con-
vinced that the human rights covenant ought to provide for the
abolition of capital punishment.
62
In contrast, other nations argued that capital punishment
was, pardon the expression, a fact of life. They contended that
safeguards should exist to prevent capricious or unjust imposi-
tion of the death penalty.' 63 In addition, it was argued that the
death penalty should be reserved for the most serious crimes,
should be imposed only by a competent court, and should be
consistent with the principles of the Universal Declaration and
handily defeated an amendment by the Netherlands that would have replaced Article 6
with a provision modeled on the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The proposed amendment would have stated more
specifically the circumstances in which homicide would be lawful. The vote was nine in
favor of the amendment and fifty against with eleven abstentions. GUIDE, supra note 79,
at 124.
159. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126; see also supra text pp. 429-31.
160. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 114, 126.
161. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126.
162. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126.
163. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126.
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the Genocide Convention.. 4
During the fifth session of the Human Rights Commission a
number of proposals for amending the right to life article were
suggested. One of those proposed amendments was submitted by
the Republic of Chile. The Chilean proposal included a number
of provisions. The second paragraph of that proposal read as fol-
lows: "[1] In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence
of death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes [2] under ordinary law [3] and never for political of-
fenses." The first part of the Chilean proposal was adopted by
the Human Rights Commission." 5 The second part of the Chil-
ean proposal was rejected and the third part was withdrawn. 6
In addition, the Chilean representative proposed to further
amend the right to life article as follows: "No one may be exe-
cuted save in virtue of the sentence of a competent court and in
accordance with a law in force and prior to the commission of
the crime so punished." 6 7 The Human Rights Commission
amended this phrase by deleting the clause starting with "and
prior to." The text as adopted read as follows: "No one may be
executed save in virtue of the sentence of a competent court and
in accordance with a law in force." As amended, the Chilean
proposal was adopted.'
At the beginning of the sixth session, in relevant part the
Human Rights Commission had the following text with which to
work:
Paragraph 2. In countries where capital punishment exists,
sentence of death may be imposed only as a penalty for the
most serious crimes.
Paragraph 3. No one may be executed save in virtue of the
sentence of a competent court and in accordance with a law in
force and not contrary to the principles expressed in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.
16 9
The United States suggested that paragraphs two and three
be merged to read as follows:
164. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126-27.
165. That is, "In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of death may
be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious crimes ... " GUIDE, supra note 79, at
129.
166. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 129.
167. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 134.
168. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 134.
169. U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. E/1371 (1949).
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In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of
death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in
accordance with law."'
The Human Rights Commission decided to adopt the proposed
United States amendment.17
The first part of the proposed United States amendment
stated: "In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence
of death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes . ,,1 This proposal provoked some criticism. Some
Commission members criticized the phrase "most serious
crimes." Reasons for criticizing the "most serious crimes" lan-
guage included the phrase's lack of precision. In addition, the
concept of serious crimes differed from country to country.173
The United States amendment was further modified with
the following language: "Not contrary to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights."'174 This language was appended to the
United States provision so that the final provision read as fol-
lows: "In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of
death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes, pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in
accordance with law not contrary to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights."'1 5
During the eighth session, the Soviet Union initially pro-
posed a draft article concerning the right to life which read in
relevant part as follows: "2. In countries where capital punish-
ment exists, sentence of death may be imposed only as a penalty
for the most serious crimes."'1 6 This provision deleted certain
language from the United States draft which was carried over
from the sixth session of the Human Rights Commission.
17
170. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126-27.
171. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 126-27.
172. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 129.
173. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 129.
174. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 131-32.
175. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 132. The U.S. provision as modified was adopted with
twelve affirmative votes and three abstentions. There were no dissents.
176. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 130.
177. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., Annex 1 at 15, U.N. Doc. E/1681 (1950). "In countries
where capital punishment exists, sentence of death may be imposed only as a penalty for
the most serious crimes, pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in accor-
dance with law not contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The lan-
guage in italics was deleted by the Soviet proposal.
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The United States and Chile proposed to amend the Soviet
provision. They sought to reintroduce the language which the
Commission had adopted in the sixth session, but which the So-
viet proposal omitted.
7 8
Accordingly, the following language was added to the Soviet
provision: "pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in
accordance with law not contrary to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights." The Human Rights Commission accepted the
American/Chilean amendment.' 79
Thus amended, the provision once more read: "In countries
where capital punishment -exists, sentence of death may be im-
posed only as a penalty for the most serious crimes, pursuant to
the sentence of a competent court and in accordance with law
not contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"
(emphasis added).
The Republic of Yugoslavia proposed an amendment to the
(amended) Soviet proposal. The Yugoslav provision added the
following language: "or the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."' 80
Accordingly, the final version passed by the eighth session
of the Human Rights Commission read as follows:
In countries where capital punishment exists, sentence of
death may be imposed only as a penalty for the most serious
crimes pursuant to the sentence of a competent court and in
accordance with law not contrary to the principles of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights or the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.18'
When the United Nations Third Committee considered the
draft of Article 6 submitted by the Commission on Human
Rights, it had before it the text cited above. It will be recalled
that a number of countries proposed amendments to Article 6.
Some of those amendments attempted to abolish capital punish-
ment.182 Other countries attempted to amend the right to life
article by protecting the rights of the unborn.18 3 And yet other
178. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 130.
179. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 130. The vote was ten to five with three abstentions.
180. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 130. The commission accepted the Yugoslav amend-
ment by a vote of thirteen to two with three abstentions. The Soviet proposal as
amended was accepted by a vote of fourteen to one with three abstentions.
181. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 135.
182. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 127. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
183. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 121. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XVIII:2
BRAVE NEW WORLD
countries attempted to make the right to life article conform
more closely to certain regional agreements, for example, the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, signed at Rome in November, 1950.184 As noted
previously, all of these proposed amendments were defeated .
5
The Third Committee appointed a working party to draft an ac-
ceptable revision of paragraph two of the Human Rights Com-
mission's draft."8 6
Several amendments to the working party draft were sug-
gested. One of those from the United Kingdom involved deleting
the words "which is" following the word "law." In addition, the
United Kingdom sought to delete the words "that is" before the
word "contrary.' 8 7 The working party adopted the proposed
amendments of the United Kingdom.8 8
As amended the text read:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sen-
tence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law [which is] in force at the
time of the commission of the crime and [that is] not contrary
to the provisions of this Covenant and to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judg-
ment rendered by a competent court.
The words in brackets were deleted.
In addition, Poland suggested an amendment to the text of
the working party's draft. That amendment would have struck
the words "in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and" from the-text submitted by the working party."' The pro-
posed Polish amendment would have read:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sen-
tence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law not contrary to the provi-
sions of this Covenant and to the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered
184. GumE, supra note 79, at 124.
185. See supra notes 84, 134, 146 & 166 and accompanying text.
186. U.N. Doc. 3764, supra note 130, at 29, para. 97.
187. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 129.
188. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 129.
189. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 131; U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 14, para.
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by a competent court.
One possible interpretation of the Polish amendment is that
the state could execute a person who committed a non-capital
crime. For example, imagine a situation where a defendant com-
mitted a non-capital offense. Later the state made the criminal
activity "capital." One could interpret the text to mean that in
those circumstances the state could lawfully execute the defend-
ant. It is not entirely clear whether this was the intent of Po-
land's proposed amendment. The Polish amendment would al-
low execution "for the most serious crimes in accordance with
the Law." It did not say that the state could execute criminals
for violations of "the law. . . in force at the time of the commis-
sion of the crime." The Third Committee rejected that amend-
ment by a vote of 29 to 25, with 16 abstentions. 1 0
A number of other amendments were suggested during the
twelfth session of the Third Committee. However, most of these
proposed amendments were withdrawn in favor of the working
party's draft.191
By roll call vote, the Third Committee adopted the working
committee's draft as revised by the British amendment.
19 2
We now pass on to the third paragraph of Article 6.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide,
it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize
any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any
way from the obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
Whereas the legislative histories of paragraphs one and two
of the right to life article are relatively long, that of paragraph
three is abbreviated. Paragraph three was proposed in draft
form for the first time by Brazil, Panama, Peru and Poland dur-
ing the twelfth session of the Third Committee. 1 3 These states
were concerned about protecting the lives of members of partic-
190. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 131.
191. See e.g., proposed amendment of Panama, GUIDE, supra note 79, at 128; pro-
posed amendment of the Phillipines, GUIDE, supra note 79, at 131; proposed amendment
of France, GUIDE, supra note 79, at 133; proposed amendment of Australia, GUIDE, supra
note 79, at 133.
192. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 135. The vote was 46 to 7 with 19 absentions.
193. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 136.
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ular groups that were threatened with extinction." These na-
tions realized that without adequate protection for the group in
which a person lived, her individual life would be meaningless.
In addition, these "four powers" were concerned to limit the
scope of capital punishment.195 Accordingly, the four powers
urged adoption of the following provision: "When deprivation of
life constitutes the crime of genocide, the provisions of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide shall apply fully."'96
This proposed amendment provoked some debate because
there were a number of states that believed it was unnecessary
to add a provision on genocide. They argued that the right to
life article and the Genocide Convention did not conflict.' 97 In
addition, they were convinced that Article 5 of the Covenant ad-
dressed the issue of preventing genocide. That provision prohib-
ited states from derogating from the human rights protected to
individuals by other conventions like the Genocide
Convention. 98
The working party suggested an amendment to the four
power provision. "When deprivation of life constitutes the crime
of genocide, the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide should apply fully in
the states that are parties thereto."'99
The four powers then submitted a further amendment to
the working party draft. The four power amendment read as fol-
lows: "When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of geno-
cide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize
any State Party to derogate in any way from any obligation as-
sumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
'20 0
Australia also introduced a proposed amendment to the four
power draft.20 1 The Australian amendment was not voted upon.
194. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para. -117.
195. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para. 117.
196. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 10, para. 92.
197. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 35-36, para. 116.
198. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 35-36, para. 116.
199. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 136. The language in italics constitutes the proposed
amendment.
200. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 136-37; U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 12, para.
109.
201. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 136 (The Australian article provided as follows:
"Nothing in this article shall authorize any states parties to derogate in any way from
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The four power amendment "borrowed" language from the
working party draft and incorporated the proposed Australian
amendment.
Canada proposed that the Third Committee vote separately
on the following langauge: "When deprivation of life constitutes
the crime of genocide, it is understood that . . . ." The Third
Committee approved this clause. 20 ' The Third Committee then
voted on the four power amendment in its entirety. The amend-
ment passed. It is now paragraph three.0 3
We now come to paragraph four:
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon, or
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases.
Like paragraphs one and two of the right to life article, par-
agraph four has a relatively long legislative history. In that re-
spect it is unlike paragraph three which was added during the
Third Committee deliberations.
Paragraph four was a response to concerns by members of
the international community who felt that for "humanitarian
reasons" the effect of the death penalty ought to be mitigated.
Accordingly, during the fifth session of the Commission on
Human Rights, the Republic of Chile proposed the following
provision: "Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of
death may be granted in all cases. 20 4 The Chilean proposal was
accepted by the Commission.0
However, some nations felt the need to curb the likelihood
of death penalty imposition so strongly that during the Commis-
sion's sixth session an amendment to the Chilean provision was
proposed. The Republic of Lebanon proposed adding a sentence
to the beginningof the Chilean provision. As amended the pro-
vision would have read as follows: "Anyone sentenced to death
shall have the right to seek amnesty, or pardon, or commuta-
tion of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the
any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.").
202. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 137. The vote was 37 in favor, 14 against, with 19
absentions.
203. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 137. The vote was 49 in favor, 5 against, with 18
absentions.
204. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 138.
205. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 138.
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sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 20 6
The Lebanese proposal emphasized that individuals who
were sentenced to death would not necessarily be killed. Ave-
nues for clemency existed. Such avenues included possible
amnesties, pardons, or commuted sentences. The Commission
adopted the Lebanese amendment.207
During the eighth session of the Human Rights Commis-
sion, the Soviet Union proposed a right to life article which had
as one of its paragraphs identical language with that of the Leb-
anese provision. 2 8 France suggested an amendment to the So-
viet provision whereby the word "amnesty" would be deleted
from the first sentence of the fourth paragraph.209
READER: Deleting "amnesty" from the first sentence was an
interesting suggestion. What was the rationale behind it?
WRITER: The reason the French suggested the "amnesty" dele-
tion was that amnesties were granted by governments to large
groups of individuals. It would not be expected that individuals
would apply for amnesties from a death sentence. A pardon or
commutation would be a more appropriate remedy.210 The
Human Rights Commission accepted the French amendment.21'
The text of paragraph four as thus amended was forwarded
to the General Assembly. Both the Human Rights Commission
and the Third Committee agreed that it was appropriate to re-
tain the reference to amnesty in the second sentence of para-
graph four. Circumstances might arise in which a collective par-
don or amnesty would be appropriate to mitigate a punishment
of death.1 2
When the Third Committee took up Article 6 during its
twelfth session in 1957, the Belgian representative requested
that the words in the second sentence "in all cases" be voted
206. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 139 (emphasis supplied).
207. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 139. The Commission vote was thirteen to one with no
abstentions.
208. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 139.
209. As amended, the Soviet proposal would have read: "Anyone sentenced to death
shall have the right to seek pardon, or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases." GUIDE, supra note
79, at 139.
210. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 138; U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 26,
paras. 171-72, U.N. Doc. E/2256 (1952) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/2256].
211. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 139. The vote was 11 in favor, 4 against the amend-
ment, with 3 abstentions.
212. U.N. Doc. E/2256, supra note 210, at 26, paras. 171-72; GUIDE, supra note 79,
at 138.
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upon. The Third Committee adopted the words "in all cases. ' 213
Paragraph four was then adopted by a unanimous vote of the
Third Committee with only two absentions 14
Paragraph five is next on our agenda:
5. "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes com-
mitted by persons below 18 years of age and shall not be car-
ried out on pregnant women."
This provision applies to three categories of individuals: first, in-
dividuals below 18 years of age; second, pregnant women; and,
third the unborn life within them. The provisions dealing with
individuals under 18 years of age will be considered separately
from those dealing with pregnant women and their children.
Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed
by persons below 18 years of age ....
During the sixth session of the Human Rights Committee,
Egypt proposed an amendment to the right to life article that
addressed capital punishment for individuals under 17 years of
age. The Egyptian provision read as follows: "Offenders under
the age of 17 years shall not be sentenced to death or to impris-
onment with hard labour for life." '215 The Egyptian proposal
would have prohibited both capital punishment and lifetime im-
prisonment with hard labor. The Human Rights Commission did
not vote on that provision.216
The issue of juvenile capital punishment remained dormant,
but resurfaced during the Third Committee's analysis of the
right to life article seven years later. A number of states felt that
because nations gave preferential treatment to juveniles and be-
cause juveniles could be rehabilitated under "firm moral and in-
tellectual guidance" that it was inappropriate to impose the sen-
tence of death upon juveniles.217 Accordingly, the Republic of
Guatemala proposed an amendment to what was then paragraph
213. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 139. "Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon, or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the
sentence of death may be granted in all cases." (emphasis supplied). The Third Commit-
tee vote was 57 in favor, 1 against, with 13 abstentions.
214. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 139. The vote was 69 to 0, with 2 absentions.
215. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 141.
216. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 141.
217. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 141; U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para.
[Vol. XVIII:2450
BRAVE NEW WORLD
four of the right to life article.2 1 Paragraph four then read as
follows: "Sentence of death shall not be carried out on a preg-
nant woman." '219 The amended text would have read: "Sentence
of death shall not be carried out on minors or on a pregnant
woman."
220
The Guatemalan representative withdrew his country's pro-
posal in favor of an amendment by the Japanese representative.
The Japanese amendment read: "Sentence of death shall not be
imposed for crimes committed by minors and shall not be car-
ried out on a pregnant woman. 22 1 The Japanese representative
agreed to a modification of his country's provision to delete the
word "minors" and replace that word with "children and young
persons." 222 That is, the Japanese amendment would have read:
"The sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes commit-
ted by children and young persons, and shall not be carried out
on a pregnant woman."
Some states objected to the language "children and young
persons" because it did not adequately address the situation of a
person who committed a crime as a juvenile but who was ar-
rested and convicted as an adult.223 In addition, some objected
to amending paragraph four because it was directed towards
protecting the lives of unborn children of mothers who had been
sentenced to death.2 Opponents of the Japanese provision ar-
gued that if minors were protected from capital punishment,
then the protection could logically be extended to those who
were insane or elderly.225 Furthermore, they argued that this
provision would be unsatisfactory for countries where age at sen-
tencing was relevant to the punishment.226
Not surprisingly, the Working Party could not come up with
an agreed text. Rather than using the words "children and
young persons," the Working Party suggested as alternatives,
"minors," "persons below 18 years of age," or "juveniles. ' ' 227
The Third Committee rejected the amendment by the
218. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 10, para. 90.
219. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 10, para. 85.
220. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 10, para. 90.
221. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 141.
222. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 141.
223. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142.
224. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 143.
225. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para. 119.
226. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para. 119.
227. U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para. 119.
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United Kingdom which would have read in relevant part: "Sen-
tence of death shall not be imposed on children and young per-
sons . ,,22" The Third Committee then voted on the Japa-
nese amendment proposing to substitute the following language
for "children and young persons": namely, "persons below 18
years of age." By a very narrow margin, 21 votes to 19, with 28
abstentions, the Third Committee approved the amendment.22
As amended, the text read in pertinent part: "The sentence
of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age .... "
We now focus attention on the rest of paragraph five,
namely: "Sentence of death shall not be . . . carried out on
pregnant women."
The provisions prohibiting capital punishment of pregnant
convicts had their origin during the eighth session of the Human
Rights Commission.230 The Yugoslav representative proposed an
amendment which, after a drafting revision suggested by Great
Britain, read as follows: "Sentence of death shall not be carried
out on a pregnant woman. ' 231 This provision had as its inspira-
tion humanitarian concerns about the welfare of the unborn
child of a pregnant woman sentenced to death. The orientation
of the provision seems to be that sentence of death ought not to
be imposed against a pregnant criminal at all. That is, even after
birth of the child it ought not to be imposed.232 The Human
Rights Commission accepted the Yugoslav provision.233
The Commission forwarded it with the rest of the Covenant
to the Third Committee for consideration. During the Third
Committee's review of this provision, some nations argued it ap-
plied solely to pregnant women before the birth of their chil-
dren.234 Other countries were of the opinion that the sentence of
death ought not to be carried out against pregnant women at all,
either before or after the birth of their children. The reason was
that the death of the mother would likely have a tremendous
adverse effect upon the development of the child.235
228. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142. The vote was 41 opposed to the amendment, 12
in favor with 19 abstentions.
229. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142.
230. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142.
231. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142.
232. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142.
233. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142. The vote was 12 to 1 with 5 abstentions.
234. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 143.
235. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 143; U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 13, para.
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Japan proposed an amendment providing that the words, "a
pregnant woman," in the Yugoslav provision, be changed to
"pregnant women. '  As amended, the Third Committee
adopted paragraph five.237
We now focus attention on the sixth and last paragraph of
Article 6.
Nothing in the article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any state party to the
present covenant.
Like paragraph three, paragraph six made a relatively late
entrance into legislative consideration.
READER: How late is relatively late?
WRITER: The draft provision that later became paragraph six
was not introduced until the Third Committee considered the
right to life article in 1957. A number of nations wished to en-
sure that Article 6 did not appear to sanction capital punish-
ment. However, the issue of capital punishment and its abolition
was "highly controversial.
'238
To ensure that the right to life article did not sanction capi-
tal punishment, Panama proposed an amendment as follows:
"The right to life is inherent in the human person. The States
Parties to the Covenant recognize the propriety of promoting
the abolition of the death penalty."23 During Working Party de-
liberations, the Panamanian representative withdrew his na-
tion's proposed amendment.240
In lieu of the Panamanian amendment, the Working Party
suggested the following: "Nothing in this article shall be invoked
to retard or to prevent any State Party to the Covenant from
abolishing capital punishment. '2 41 The Working Party text was
revised orally, and the following language adopted by the Third
Committee: "Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or
118.
236. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 143 (Accordingly, the Japanese amendment would
have read in pertinent part as follows: "Sentence of death... shall not be carried out on
pregnant women.").
237. GuIDE, supra note 79, at 143. The vote was 53 in favor, 5 against, with 14
abstentions.
238. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 144; U.N. Doc. A/3764, supra note 130, at 12, para.
111.
239. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 144.
240. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 144.
241. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 144.
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to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State
Party to the Covenant."242
We now return to your earlier concerns regarding the inter-
pretation of statutes, especially those in the international human
rights context.
READER: I am glad you have laid out the background for an
analysis of the meaning of this text. Statutory analysis should be
straightforward. Look at the words of the text; "hear" the
"voice" of the legislator; and give effect to the legislative intent.
As simple as one, two, three! Right?!
WRITER: I suspect that there is a bit more to it than that. The
ICCPR is an international treaty. Its interpretation must de-
pend in part on reference to evolving international standards on
treaty interpretation. For example, a number of states have rati-
fied the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 243 Among
other things, that convention sets forth internationally agreed
standards for interpreting treaties. For instance, under Article
31 of the Vienna Convention, it is stated: "A treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."
READER: What does that mean?
WRITER: That means, in part, the following. States which
make a treaty must interpret that treaty in good faith and follow
the ordinary meaning given to the treaty terms. However, the
ordinary meaning must be considered in "context." According to
Article 31, "context" includes a treaty's preamble and annexes
"in addition to the text." Context also encompasses "any agree-
ment relating to the treaty which was made between all the par-
ties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. .. Thus
the Vienna Convention gives "context" a broad definition.
Moreover, the interpretation of a treaty involves recognizing
the object and purpose of the treaty. So, for instance, the object
and purpose of the International Covenant on Political and Civil
Rights embraces the creation of a comprehensive framework for
the international protection of human rights. The more specific
242. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 144. The Third Committee adopted 'paragraph 6 by a
vote of 54 in favor, 4 against and with 1 abstention.
243. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). The Vienna
Convention was concluded at Vienna on May 23, 1969. The Convention became effective
on January 27, 1980.
244. Id. art. 31, § 2a.
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object and purpose of Article 6 was to protect the right to life.
In addition, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides:
"3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its in-
terpretation. . . ." Thus the convention contemplates using the
parties' subsequent behavior as an aid to properly interpreting
it.
Furthermore, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention says that:
"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article thirty-one; or to deter-
mine the meaning when the interpretation according to article
thirty-one:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable."
In short, the Vienna Convention allows treaty interpretation
to embrace a wide range of factors. They include the ordinary
meaning of treaty provisions, the context in which the treaty
was adopted, the object and purpose of the treaty in that partic-
ular context, and the treaty's legislative history. Further, treaty
interpretation may encompass the subsequent practice of parties
to the provision. Such practice may be relevant to the extent
that it helps establish what parties agree is the treaty's
meaning.245
You mentioned that statutory interpretation was "statutory
interpretation."
To some extent the Vienna Convention suggests that many
of the traditional canons of statutory interpretation are applica-
ble here. Let me illustrate.24 A distinquished American jurist
has said: "The Court no doubt must listen to the voice of Con-
gress. But often Congress cannot be heard clearly because its
speech is muffled. ' '247 In addition, one confronts the issue of how
245. Other considerations which may impact treaty interpretation include whether
the parties have made a "subsequent agreement" regarding its meaning or application,
whether other international law rules are relevant to the parties' relationship, and
whether the parties intended that treaty provisions would have a "special meaning." Id.
art. 31, §§ 3a, 3c, and 4.
246. Portions of this section appeared in Stubbs, supra note 58.
247. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 2 RECORD OF
1992]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
to "master" the words of a statute so that they make sense. That
is what the process of statutory interpretation involves.
Some may object to formulating the question like this, i.e.
in terms of mastering the statutes' words. One rather fundamen-
tal objection is that the words need no master. The words need a
reasonable interpretation.
READER: Amen! In fact the Vienna Convention says as much
when it states that we interpret treaties by giving them their
ordinary meaning.
WRITER: I agree with you that treaties must be interpreted in
part by giving the treaty terms their ordinary meaning. No one
disputes that. However, we need a more comprehensive interpre-
tive theory. Particularly in the human rights area, there are
some pragmatic, theoretical and institutional considerations that
need to be addressed. I will briefly explore them after dealing in
more detail with some of what you referred to as "established,
hornbook law."
You seem in agreement with the proposition that the words
of a treaty need no master - just a reasonable interpretation.
READER: Yes.
WRITER: I suppose your argument would essentially contend
that the statutes were drafted by literate intelligent persons; and
therefore no great difficulty should plague their interpretation.
READER: Certainly the drafting was done by reasonably liter-
ate people. Whether a legislature or institution possesses intelli-
gence is a matter for debate. In addition, one presumes a reason-
ably literate and intelligent reader or interpreter of the
document.
WRITER: Perhaps that is where the reasonable person "comes
in." But even in favorable circumstances involving reasonable
N.Y.C.B.A. 213, 224 (1947) cited in, Richard I. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent
and the Use of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A
Reexamination, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 128, 134 (1972) [hereinafter Nunez].
Lewis Carroll made the point differently in THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
"And only one is for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!"
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,"' Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled
contemptuously. "Of course you don't till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice
knock-down argument for you!'"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down arguement,'" Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less." "The question is,"
said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master that's all."
LEWIS CARROLL, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 186 (1960).
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legislators and interpreters, history teaches us that problems
may arise.
For example, even twenty four hundred years ago, the prob-
lem of statutory interpretation reared its head in one of Plato's
dialogues. In The Laws, Plato discussed the judge's role in fur-
thering the legislator's intent when imposing a sentence under
the criminal laws:
[T]he law must take careful aim at its mark; it must be exact
in determining the magnitude of the correction imposed on the
particular offense, and ... the judge must have the same task
before him, and lend his services to the legislator, when the law
leaves it to his discretion to a defendant's fine or sentence; the
legislator ... is like a draftsman who must design the outlines
of cases which answer to the code.24
Thus, Plato at least implicitly recognized the existence of a dy-
namic relationship between the legislature and the judiciary in
the creation of the law and administration of justice. The judge's
role involved furthering the will of society as expressed through
the legislature's enactments.
Similarly, during the time of Jesus of Nazareth the issue of
the proper construction of law "waxed" most volatile. For exam-
ple, one Sabbath his disciples were hungry and while walking
through the fields "plucked the ears of corn, and did eat, rub-
bing them in their hands."249 Of course taking what did not be-
long to you was against the law.250 And to make it worse, the
disciples committed the offense on the Sabbath - the day one
was to remember "to keep it holy.
251
When confronted with these facts, Jesus first cited the pre-
cedent of David eating the "shewbread" which was only lawful
for the priests to eat; and secondly asserted that He (Jesus) was
"Lord also of the Sabbath. '252 By saying He was Lord of the
Sabbath, Jesus called attention to His authority - that is he
represented the First Century basic norm or rule of
recognition. 5 3
248. THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1484 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., 1961).
249. Luke 6:1.
250. "Thou shalt not steal." Exodus 20:15.
251. Exodus 20:8.
252. Luke 6:5.
253. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 110-24 (1945)
(the basic norm stemmed from the fact that Jesus had been delegated this duty to create
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And secondly, the example of plucking one's neighbor's corn
on the Sabbath is an early example of the application of statu-
tory interpretation's golden rule. This is not the Golden rule
with which we are familiar: "[A]ll things whatsoever ye would
that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.
25 4
Rather this rule may be stated as follows:
It is a very useful rule, in [statutory construction], to adhere to
the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammati-
cal construction, unless that [militates against the legislature's
intent] . . .or leads to ... manifest absurdity ... in which
case the language may be varied or modified .... 25
This case was one in which it could not be said that the legisla-
tor intended for his disciples to perish, and since statutes must
be construed as speaking in the present: the legislator was
present.256
Statutory interpretation's golden rule is reflected in the text
of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. That article says in rele-
vant part: "Recourse may be had to supplementary means of in-
terpretation . . . to determine the meaning when the interpreta-
tion according to [A]rticle [31] . ..(b) leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
More recently, another canon of statutory construction has
been adopted. It is the so-called "mischief rule," and as a matter
of Anglo-American common law, antedates the golden rule. In
Heydon's case,25 decided in 1584, the Barons of the Exchequer
lucidly stated the mischief rule:
And it was resolved by them that for the sure and true inter-
pretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to
be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the
Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and ap-
this norm). Cf., HART, supra note 10, at 92.
254. Matthew 7:12.
255. Becke v. Smith 2 M. & W., 191, 195, cited in, SiR RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 16 (J. Bell & G. Eagle eds., 1987) [hereinafter CRoss].
256. The Longford (1889) 14 P.D. 34 (1888) (Lord Esher) cited in CROSS, supra note
255, at 49.
257. 3 Co. Rep. 7 (1584).
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pointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and
4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of
all the judges is always to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance
of the mischief, and pro privato commodo and to add
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the
true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
25 s
The mischief rule has been frequently applied in American
courts - see for example Powell v. Alabama;250 Jones v. Alfred
Mayer;260 and Boyd v. United States26' - and the rule has been
the subject of substantial academic commentary.
26 2
The mischief rule's "imprint" is found in the Vienna Con-
vention too. For example, Article 31 says that nations must in-
terpret treaties "in light of [their] object and purpose." That is
another way of saying that the law must be expounded to elimi-
nate "mischief" which the legislature has recognized.
A third canon of statutory construction is the "literal rule."
The literal rule has frequently endeared itself to the English
courts:
The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament, is
that they should be construed according to the intent of the
Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the Statute
are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can
be necessary than to expound those words in that natural and
ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case,
best declare the intention of the lawgiver .... 263
In more recent years, the mischief rule has made something of a
"comeback. ,264
258. Id. at 7a, quoted in CROSS, supra note 255, at 9.
259. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
260. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
261. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
262. CROSS, supra note 255, at 10-11. For a provocative discussion see LORD ALFRED
THOMPSON DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 9-22 (1979) [hereinafter DISCIPLINE]; G.C.
MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 237-74 (Robert
Summers ed., 1968); Nunez, supra note 247, at 128-34. See also the helpful discussion in
D.N. McCORMICK & R.S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES 511-15 (1991).
263. Sussex Peerage Claim, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 143 (1844), quoted in CROSS, supra
note 255, at 14; see DISCIPLINE, supra note 262, at 11-16; see also Roberts v. Hopwood,
All E.R. (H.L.) 24, 33-36 (1925), per Lord Atkinson.
264. See, e.g., Ealing L.B.C. v. Race Relations Board, [1972] App. Cas. (H.L.) 342,
360-61 (1971); see also Bushell v. Faith, 1970 App. Ca. 1099, 1108 (1969). In elucidating a
section of the Company Act of 1948, Lord Upjohn said: "[W]hen construing an Act of
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The literal rule manifests itself in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention. The article mandates a good faith interpretation of
the document. That interpretation is based in part on giving the
text or "terms" of the treaty their "ordinary meaning."
Thus the Vienna Convention encompasses the literal,
golden and mischief rules. When applied complimentarily, the
rules work as follows. First, one looks at the plain and ordinary
meaning of the words of the statute and "sees" what kind of
result would flow from applying the words in that fashion. Sec-
ond, one attempts to ascertain whether the result is an absurd
one through using common sense or if one is still at a loss,
through looking at the treaty's "object and purpose" to see what
mischief the parties tried to eradicate. Then one construes the
statute so as to "suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy.
'265
Many other sub-rules and presumptions concerning statu-
tory interpretation exist. It is beyond the scope of our conversa-
tion to discuss them in detail.66 Suffice it to say that they are
essentially unnecessary for the analysis of the right to life provi-
sions of Article 6.
However, one other rule of statutory interpretation deserves
brief notice before we pass on to analyze Article 6. That is the
rule concerning the analysis of the structure and relationship of
the parts of the document to the whole.267 Stated simply the
theory of structure and relationship is this. First, you analyze
the words of the section of the statute in their context. Next, see
what the draftsperson intended (generally) to do, how the re-
lated sections of the statute further that intent and then give
the section under your scrutiny a meaning which furthers the
legislature's general intent. In ascertaining that intent: "[N]o
one should profess to understand any part of a document until
he has read the whole of it. '2 s Thus, having read the entire doc-
Parliament it is a canon of construction that its provisions must be construed in the light
of the mischief which the Act was designed to meet." Id.
265. Heyd.on's Case,.(1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a.
266. These rules and presumptions are admirably collected and discussed in CRoss,
supra note 255; cf. DISCIPLINE, supra note 262, at 9-22; see also REED DICKsRSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975).
267. This theory of statutory interpretation is brilliantly expounded in CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) [hereinafter
BLACK].




ument and seen how the parts relate to the whole, one can say
whether any particular part has a meaning which is "clear and
unambiguous. ' 269 Of course, "the entire document" here should
be read as meaning all the relevant portions of it.
2 7 °
Furthermore, in a penetrating analysis of the theory of
structure and relationship, Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. has
demonstrated that the theory goes even further. One may apply
the theory to constitutional controversies. The theory may apply
even when no particular provision of the Constitution says any-
thing specific about the disputed issue.27'
The way one applies the "enlarged" theory of structure and
relationship is this. First, read the Constitution to ascertain gen-
erally what the Framers intended. Then, in the particular case
presented, reach a result which is consonant with that intent.
2 72
So, for example, imagine a case in which a United States
citizen satisfies all the requirements to vote in a state election
except that he is a "member of the Armed Forces of the United
States." For that reason alone the state denies him the right to
vote. 3
Applying the principles of Professor Black's structure and
relationship theory, one can analyze this case by saying that the
Framers intended to create a federal union under which the
States and federal government cooperated to achieve objectives
essential to their joint survival. Further, the Framers did not in-
tend for the States to interfere with federal agents engaged in
performing functions vital to the nation's existence, e.g. serving
in the armed forces; therefore, the State acted outside its consti-
tutional jurisdiction in denying a federal offical the right to
vote. 4
Thus applying the theory of structure and relationship, one
may reach the same conclusion as the Court, but on different
grounds.275
269. Id.
270. For example, in order to construe § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code concern-
ing tax exemptions for fellowships, I.R.C. §§ 117 (1988), one would not need to - or care
to - read the hundreds (thousands) of sections of the entire Code.
271. BLACK, supra note 267, at 3-32.
272. BLACK, supra note 267, at 7-12.
273. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), cited in BLACK, supra note 267, at 8.
274. BLACK, supra note 267, at 10-11. Professor Black states his conclusion as thus:
"[I]t ought to be held that no state may annex any disadvantage simply and solely to the
performance of a federal duty." BLACK, supra note 267, at 11.
275. The Court decided the case on the grounds that the Texas statute violated the
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READER: Or one can reach a conclusion different than that of
the Court.
WRITER: That is true. It is worthwhile pointing out that the
theory of structure and relationship may be applicable in in-
stances where the other rules of statutory interpretation are not.
The mischief, literal and golden rules are particularly applicable
when one is attempting to extract some meaning from a legisla-
tive or constitutional text. However, one may use the structure
and relationship theory to reach an interpretive decision where
the statute or constitutional provision says nothing about the
precise legal dispute before the reader.
The rules of statutory interpretation and the theory of
structure and relationship may merge. This can happen when
the courts attempt to apply the rules of statutory interpretation
to cases where the statute or authoritative text is not directly
applicable. Carrington v. Rush is a good example. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says nothing
about states regulating the right of the national government's
soldiers to vote in state elections. Nonetheless, concerning the
exercise of the franchise, States must treat federal soldiers like
other State citizens and allow them to vote.
The Court's analysis implicitly adopts the mischief rule ap-
proach in that the Court attempts to identify the "defect" in the
law which the Equal Protection Clause sought to remedy. That
Clause attempts to eradicate invidiously discriminatory state ac-
tions. Such a state action existed in that case, i.e. preventing
otherwise qualified state citizens from voting because they were
also members of the United States Armed Forces.
Had the Court adopted the structure and relationship ana-
lytical framework the Court would have perceived the relation-
ship between the state and the national government in addition
to the relationship of the individual and the State. Merging the
mischief rule with the theory of structure and relationship gives
us a broader, clearer perception of laws.
The structure and relationship theory seems implicit in the
Vienna Convention's interpretive approach. That is, the conven-
tion expressly invites interpretations based on considering the
text and the context. Among other things that requires analyz-
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Carrington,
380 U.S. at 96.
276.. Or is only arguably applicable. See Professor Black's criticism of the Court's
Equal Protection approach. BLACK, supra note 267, at 9-10.
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ing the relationship of relevant parts of a legislative provision to
one another. Structure and relationship theory requires the
same type analysis.
At this stage, one may ask the question, "What does Article
6 mean?" The answer to that question depends on a number of
factors. What a legislative provision means is impacted by the
literal text, the legislative history, and the structure and rela-
tionship of the parts of the document to the whole. We will ad-
dress those concerns momentarily. After briefly addressing those
issues, we will examine the practice of the Human Rights Com-
mittee. That should give us a better sense of what the text
means from a practical perspective.
Finally, the subject matter of the text influences the con-
struction that it should receive. For instance, criminal statutes
should be construed narrowly and human rights statutes
broadly. Criminal statutes often restrict and may extinguish life
and liberty; human rights statutes seek to expand and protect
life and liberty.
READER: I am not sure that I buy the argument that human
rights statutes should receive some special consideration. It
seems to me that statutes are statutes regardless of the subject
matter!
WRITER: "Statutes are statutes" is true. However, statutes
which deal with the preservation of human life, liberty and dig-
nity ought to receive a sympathethic interpretation. So much is
at stake - quite literally the survival and progress of the human
species.
READER: But that is in part a value judgment. Moreover, I
sense an element of melodrama creeping into the conversation.
We are dealing with a legal text. Rhetoric cannot substitute for
reason!
WRITER: The argument, as most arguments, includes underly-
ing "values." An important "value" or good is human life. It is
my judgment that such life should be protected. Even as we
speak, millions are dying from war, disease and famine. Those
are facts. And those facts constitute a sad part of the drama of
the human condition. This is not melodrama. It is reality played
out on the stage of history.
Thousands of people have been convicted of crimes and sit
on Death Rows around the globe. Many face death principally
for "speaking truth to power." How is taking an adversarial pos-
ture on their behalf an unfair use of rhetoric?
1992]
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We do have a legal text - that is true. Nevertheless, one
must choose an interpretive framework for understanding this
statute. The best framework is one that allows development of
the drafters' general intent to protect life.
READER: Why?
WRITER: Because history is full of ambiguities. Legislative his-
tory is no exception. A more "human rights friendly" interpre-
tive approach would facilitate protecting the lives of individuals
in controversial cases. That is more appropriate than leaving
them without legal "cover." A narrower view will allow despotic
states wider latitude to legally destroy life. A narrow view means
the right to life is less likely to apply. The despot's acts escape
legal sanction.
To some a broader more inclusive framework may be the
"obvious" interpretive approach. To others such a framework
may seem based on "conjecture" and even, deadliest of all sins,
could be labelled "liberal." I think it is fair and that there is
ample support for the position.
We must never forget that we are talking about living
breathing human beings - like you and me!
READER: Calm down! You are getting emotional on me. We are
talking about law and the proper construction of it. I am not
convinced that there is ample support for your expansive inter-
pretation theory.
WRITER: I am not sure what you mean by an "expansive inter-
pretation theory." But I take your concern to be that an expan-
sive interpretation theory as you call it or a general intent the-
ory as I view it would go beyond the creators' intent when they
drafted the document.
READER: And that would allow subsequent interpreters to re-
write the document in their own philosophical image.
WRITER: In interpreting any document, that is a danger. Just
look at what happens to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the United States Constitution as the Court's membership
changes. In this case, my argument is that the general intent of
the document is to protect human life in a broad manner, and in
a number of circumstances. The ample support that I find for
this position involves history, common sense, legal theory and
.Human Rights Committee practice.
From an historical perspective, when writing the ICCPR,




The drafters started their work only six months after the
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki .2  The victorious
powers created the United Nations to help save "succeeding
generations from the scourge of war. ' 27s Accordingly, the draft-
ers refrained from spending much time dealing with what for
them was obvious: Article 6 assumed that armed conflict among
nations was minimal. In light of then recent history, namely
World War II, extensive warfare would have contradicted pro-
tecting the right to life. Accordingly, there seemed no compelling
reason to explicitly address the issue of war and protecting life.
Similarly, it seemed unnecessary for the drafters to state
that Article 6 presumed that human beings had the means of
subsistence such as food, water, shelter, and health care. Unless
the drafters assumed such necessities existed, the discussion of
the right to life would have been at best academic. One may ar-
gue that this is speculative, that the drafters should have written
concerns about larger issues like war and human survival into
the ICCPR. In interpreting historical circumstances, an element
of speculation is mixed with the interpreter's conclusions. Un-
doubtedly the drafters could have explicitly included more right
to life concerns in the text. Whether political considerations
played a part larger than is immediately obvious is unclear.
In this historical context, the text of Article 6 deals gener-
ally with protecting the "inherent right to life." In addition, it
focuses on narrower issues, like capital punishment. The drafters
did not need to write, "We contemplate no major wars." Neither
did they have to say, "[W]e presume that nations will make
their best efforts to ensure that individuals within their borders
will be fed, clothed, sheltered, and furnished health care." Those
are assumptions fundamental to the existence of human
civilization.
READER: That may or may not be true. The point is, we have a
text and that is what we construe. We must not get bogged down
in the metaphysical speculations of what was in the minds of the
drafters. The important aspect of what was in their minds is on
paper.
WRITER: I agree in part. Important aspects of what the draft-
ers thought has been written. It is reflected in the current text of
Article 6. But all that the drafters contemplated is not reflected
277. August 6 and August 9, 1945.
278. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
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in the text. The drafters are not required to state the obvious. It
makes little sense to talk about the right to life if we presume a
world in which major wars are common and the norm is for gov-
ernments to neglect basic necessities like providing food for the
materially needy. Common sense requires that we not separate
the text from its historical context.
Furthermore, regarding interpretive theory, the literal and
mischief rules of statutory construction apply. That is the literal
text itself protects the inherent right to life, meaning the "natu-
ral" or "God-given" right, of human beings to live. The mandate
is a general one - directed to the survival and preservation of
the human species. The text itself says that "Every human being
has the inherent right to life."
Moreover, the text .of the ICCPR is directed generally to-
wards the historical mischief of massive deprivation of human
rights associated with the Axis Powers. That tyranny plunged
the world into the Second World War. The deprivation of
human rights included the deprivation of the right to life on a
large scale.
I recognize that cynics or "realists" may disagree. But I
choose neither cynicism nor "realism" in the sense of being pes-
simistic about the nature of humanity.
It is in this broad historical context that the text of Article
6 also implicitly acknowledges the existence of capital
punishment.
With these comments, let us refocus attention on the (writ-
ten) text of Article 6:
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.
The drafters of Article 6 recognized that the right to life is
an essential part of what it means to be a human being.
2 79 Most
drafters took a "natural rights" position regarding protecting
life. The right to life was not conferred upon human beings by
the state. 80 The right originated independently of human insti-
tutions. The right "dwells" - inheres in the essence of human
being (existence!).
To give some "teeth" to the provision protecting human life,
279. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 119.
280. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 119.
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paragraph one of Article 6 commands that states protect the
right to life legally. The state must protect "[tihis right ... by
law." States must protect the right to life not only from public
officials, but also from private persons."'
The drafters recognized nevertheless, that circumstances ex-
isted in which an individual's life may be extinguished. Para-
graph one states that -"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life." That suggests that an individual may not have his life ter-
minated unjustly or illegally.2 2 Implicitly, however, paragraph
one recognizes that a human being may be "deprived" of her
life. The questions become by whom and under what
circumstances.
This is where paragraph one and paragraph two overlap in
some respects. Paragraph two addresses these issues. The draft-
ers of Article 6 recognized that the death penalty was a reality.
Nations may kill their citizens for criminal behavior.
The drafters found themselves wrestling with how they
might curb capital punishment. Paragraph two addresses that
dilemma by recognizing that the death penalty only applies in
nations which have not yet abolished it. In such nations, the
state can kill individuals only for the most serious crimes. Even
in those circumstances, the death penalty can only be imple-
mented under a law existing at the time the crime was commit-
ted. The drafters circumscribed the death penalty even further
by mandating a final judgment of a competent court. In this re-
spect, paragraphs one and two recognize the sanctity of life, but
at the same time the reality that many countries have the death
penalty.
Paragraph three of the article further restricts capital pun-
ishment so that states may not impose it contrary to the Geno-
cide Convention. States which have ratified the ICCPR and the
Genocide Convention may not commit genocide against
individuals.
Paragraph four recognizes that even where the state decrees
the death penalty, it has limited application. Any individual sen-
tenced to death may seek a pardon or a commutation of the sen-
tence. Furthermore, the article specifically provides for an am-
nesty in circumstances where that is appropriate for classes of
281. Most states were in favor of imposing upon the national government responsi-
bility for protecting individual human life against both the state and private individuals.
GUIDE, supra note 79, at 120.
282. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 122.
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individuals as distinguished from a-particular person.
The drafters further limited the scope of the death penalty
by outlawing its application in circumstances where individuals
are under 18 years of age or in cases where a convicted person is
pregnant. The drafters' intent was to avoid imposition of the
death penalty against young people who might be "saved"
through rehabilitation measures. In addition, they sought to
spare the unborn child from either death or life as an orphan.28s
Finally, Article 6 explicitly sent a signal to the international
community that it was not intended to delay or prevent the abo-
lition of capital punishment. The final paragraph of Article 6
says so: "Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or pre-
vent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to
the Present Covenant. '28 4 In fact, the structure of the text indi-
cates that Article 6 is directed towards encouraging nations to
protect the right to life and to abolish capital punishment.
While the text does not focus expressly on the measures
that states must take to protect life, Article 6 contemplates that
states must give wide ranging support to human life.
Moreover, the general intent interpretation theory that you
find objectionable has strong support in the writings of some
well respected academic lawyers. Some of these themes are re-
flected in an excellent collection of essays on protecting the right
to life at international law.2 5 These interpretations of Article 6
are consistent with a proper construction of human rights
statutes.
As you read the text in its context, you can see that the
scope of its coverage is broad. Moreover, from a "practice"
standpoint, a "thumbnail sketch" of the first thirteen years of
Human Rights Committee interpretation of Article 6 reveals the
following cause of events.
288
During the first year, Human Rights Committee members
requested the reporting nations to furnish information regarding
offenses for which the death penalty could be imposed, the fre-
quency of the death penalty, and how such sentences were car-
283. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 142-43.
284. GUIDE, supra note 79, at 144.
285. See THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985).
286. Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this discussion to independently evaluate




tied out.28 Committee members also requested data regarding
the reduction of one nation's (Ecuador's) infant mortality
rate.28
8
These inquiries suggest that at an early stage the Human
Rights Committee believed that the right to life encompassed
state action affecting capital punishment and infant mortality.
Committee questions assumed the existence of a (civilized)
world order characterized by governmental concern for the lives
of its children. In addition, the Committee recognized the politi-
cal reality of capital punishment's existence.
The second annual Human Rights Committee report re-
flected similar questions regarding the categories of crimes that
were punishable by death. In addition, countries were asked to
furnish statistics regarding their application of the death pen-
alty over the past several years.2 89 In a noteworthy development,
the Committee requested that the Danish representative furnish
information regarding what was being done to combat infant
mortality, maternal mortality, and drug abuse.29
Thus, in practice, the Committee reaffirmed the view that
the right to life involved not just the death penalty, but also
encompassed the issues of infant, mortality and life expec-
tancy.2 91 Furthermore, the Human Rights Commitee seemed to
believe that the right to life encompassed state action to combat
not only infant mortality but also maternal mortality, and chem-
ical dependency.
Moreover, Committee practice was remarkable because the
Committee explored the circumstances in which the police and
security forces in several nations could use their weapons.292
In at least one case involving a nation that had abolished
the death penalty (The Federal Republic of Germany), the
Human Rights Committee broadened its inquiry. The Commit-
287. See e.g., [1977-1978] 2 Y.B. of the Hum. Rts. Comm. 229 (1986) [hereinafter
YEARBOOK (77-78)], questions asked of the Syrian Arab Republic; and at 232, questions
asked of Tunisia.
288. Id. at 234.
289. Id. at 256 (Committee questions directed to Libya.)
290. Id. at 259. No death sentence had been carried out in Denmark since 1946.
291. Id.
292. The former German Democratic Republic, id. at 264, Czechoslavakia, id. at
261, and Iran, id. at 275, were asked questions along these lines.
In addition, the Committee requested information regarding whether political of-
fenses in Iran were punishable by death; the number of executions performed in recent
years; and whether Iran had considered abolishing the death penalty.
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tee asked how the Federal Republic protected the right to life as
it related to the murder rate, the safety of laborers, industrial
accidents and the higher rate of infant mortality among migrant
workers. In addition, the Committee was concerned about the
infant mortality rate among the poor, the safeguards regarding
arbitrary use of force by police and military personnel in case of
riot or escape from prison or arrest,2 9 and the prevention of
drug abuse.
The Committee also asked state representatives of Yugosla-
via,294 the former Soviet Union,9 5 Mauritius,29 and the former
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic9 7 whether their countries
had considered the possible abolition of the death penalty.
Thus, the second annual report expanded the scope of in-
quiry to include maternal mortality, drug abuse, police violence,
the circumstances in which a woman could obtain an abortion,
worker safety, capital punishment for political offenses, and
state plans to abolish the death penalty. Committee questions
often depended upon the steps that nations had taken to protect
life. For example, where nations had abolished the death pen-
alty, questions focused more on the preservation of life in other
areas like infant health and employee safety.298
The third annual report of the Human Rights Committee
found Committee members asking about capital punishment for
economic crimes (e.g., "misuse of public funds and embezzle-
ment").299 In addition, in at least one case, the question was
raised regarding how often capital punishment had been im-
posed since the state (Bulgaria) had adopted the ICCPR.300
The Committee (Romania) pointed out that Article 6 re-
quires states to take necessary measures to reduce infant mortal-
ity, but that the protection of adult life was equally
important.30'
In another case (Spain), some Committee members ex-
pressed concern that the death penalty had been replaced by
293. Id. at 278.
294. Id. at 281.
295. Id. at 285.
296. Id. at 289.
297. Id. at 294.
298. Id. at 278 (inquiries made of the Federal Republic of Germany's government).
299. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 481. These inquiries flowed from
Romania's initial report.
300. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 476.
301. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 481.
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long prison sentences of between thirty and forty years .2 The
Committee asked regarding the possibilities existing for pardon
or appeal of a sentence of capital punishment 3 3 and how one
state (the former Ukranian S.S.R.) could reconcile its policy of
reforming and re-educating convicts while continuing to execute
some of them.
30 4
In another report involving human rights protection in the
dependent territories of a nation (the United Kingdom), the
Committee asked about comparative rates of infant mortality
for the territories and the "metropolitan"' state.s0 5 Committee
members wanted information involving the prospects for abol-
ishing the death penalty in the territories and clarification on
possible capital punishment of juveniles.30 6 Finally, the Commit-
tee wanted to know information -concerning territorial laws af-
fecting genocide.
In at least one instance (Cyprus) the report indicated that
the death penalty could not be imposed upon persons under the
age of sixteen.0 Implicitly, it seems that for individuals who
were over sixteen the state could impose such a penalty.
308
In another context (Finland's first report), the Committee
asked questions involving national measures to protect life
through enhancing maternity benefits and facilities, maintaining
adequate nutrition levels for children and adults, protecting the
environment, and supporting the right to work 09 This inquiry
provoked a response from the affected country that the nation
had extensive legislation protecting the social welfare and pro-
viding for medical care; but that the government felt that these
issues fell within the purview of articles nine through twelve of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.310 Further, apparently for the first time, a question was
raised involving the transplant of human tissue, for the Finnish
representative said that it was "expressly prohibited" to take
302. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 486.
303. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 495.
304. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 495.
305. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 503.
306. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 503.
307. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 196.
308. The state representative said that where the Covenant conflicted with the pe-
nal code of the Republic, the Covenant provisions prevailed. This suggested that in some
states, the ICCPR is the "supreme" human rights protection for citizens.
309. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 514.
310. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 516.
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medical measures against the will of a patient. 1'
These initial reports indicate that some Human Rights
Committee members' broad interpretation of Article 6 met early
"state resistance" in areas affecting economic and social rights.
While this is understandable, one also is reminded that the
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights overlap in many respects, share some identical
provisions and have a common origin.3 12
During the fourth annual report of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, states were asked what were becoming routine questions
regarding the types of offenses for which capital punishment
could be imposed, against whom capital punishment could be
imposed, and whether the particular country had considered
abolishing capital punishment.3 1 3 In addition, the Committee
frequently raised concerns about steps taken to reduce the in-
fant mortality rate, the nation's legal position regarding abor-
tion, and regulation of police use of firearms.
31 4
The Committee also requested information concerning mea-
sures protecting the right to life as a "social value." Such mea-
sures were contrasted with criminal sanctions for protecting the
right to life.31 5
Some Committee members also commented on a Mongolian
law exempting women from the imposition of the death penalty
and expressed hope that that "humanitarian exclusion" would
apply to men as well.3 10
In addition, members also asked the representative of one
state (Iraq) whether the death penalty applied to certain non-
violent offenses, for example, membership in more than one po-
litical party.
3 17
In one case (Senegal), the Committee asked what was meant
by the statement that a minor who was above the age of thirteen
would be sentenced to ten to twenty years imprisonment if the
311. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 517.
312. See INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41-43.
313. See YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 542 (Mongolia); at 545-46 (Iraq); at
556 (Senegal).
314. See, e.g., questions put to the representative of Canada, YEARBOOK (79-80),
supra note 15, at 550.
315. These comments were made in the context of Poland's report. YEARBOOK (79-
80), supra note 15, at 536.
316. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 542.
317. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 546.
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death penalty were pronounced.3 18 The Committee also wanted
information regarding whether pregnant women were executed.
In a move reflecting Committee sensitivity and flexibility in-
volving the circumstances of individual states, the Committee
took a somewhat advisory role regarding Suriname's report. The
Committee noted that it was dealing with a new government
which was creating a new constitution and laws.319 Concerning
the right to life, the Committee members requested information
about the public health insurance system that had been prom-
ised for Suriname's economically disadvantaged residents and
for public civil servants.
The Committee also requested information regarding legis-
lation which gave a state's (Columbia's) security forces immu-
nity involving operations which resulted in the death of individ-
uals.3 20 Committee members re-emphasized that the right to life
meant more than avoiding death at the hand of another human
being, but also involved the necessity of creating appropriate ec-
onomic and social conditions.3 2' This emphasis implies a general
process of social, political and economic development.
Similar concerns involving protecting the right to life in the
context of developing societies were reflected in the summaries
of the Committee's fifth annual report. The Committee pointed
out that the right to life protection extended beyond the arbi-
trary deprivation of individual life and placed upon authorities
an affirmative duty to take measures that would help enhance
the likelihood of individuals having safe, productive lives. Thus,
for example, the Committee asked about national efforts to re-
duce infant mortality, illiteracy, unemployment and the risk of
individuals falling prey to either common law murder or political
murder.32 2
Several national representatives were asked specifically
about measures taken to improve their countries' public health
systems. For instance, Committee members requested data re-
garding Tanzanian government steps to protect life in rural ar-
eas by improving public health.
3 23
318. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 556.
319. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 565.
320. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 561.
321. YEARBOOK (79-80), supra note 15, at 561.
322. See, e.g., [1981-1982] 2 Y.B. or THE HUM. RTS. COMM. 247-48, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
3/Add.1 (1989) [hereinafter YEAIBOOK (81-82)], discussing Venezuela's report.
323. Id. at 266. Similarly, Committee members requested that Mali's representative
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Committee members emphasized that the right to life was
inherent, its protection extended beyond penal laws, 24 and its
protection should be manifest in social and humanitarian law.325
It is not surprising, therefore, that Committee concern for pro-
tecting life would encompass public health issues including pro-
grams to deal with drug abuse. An example of such concern in-
volved the Committee's request for information concerning
Portugal's laws prohibiting drug dependency. 28
Nevertheless, the Committee maintained its steadfast con-
cern for matters involving capital punishment and governmental
use of armed force against private persons. Accordingly, the
Committee requested information concerning government regu-
lation of the use of firearms by public officials, 327 the circum-
stances in which pregnant convicts could be executed,328 govern-
mental plans for abolishing the death penalty,329 and the
frequency of commuted capital sentences. 30 Members of the
Committee noted that the ultimate aim of the Covenant was to
convince countries to abolish the death penalty.
3 31
The representative of Mali made the interesting observation
that his nation would conform its behavior to that taken at the
regional level in Africa regarding human rights. This suggests
that the evolution of international law right to life standards
furnish information concerning governmental measures to promote improved public
health. Id. at 270.
324. Id. at 261 (discussion of the report of Barbados).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 278.
327. Id. at 256 (questions raised with the Italian representative). Similarly, in con-
sidering Jamaica's report, the Committee requested information concerning what steps
were taken to control the police use of firearms. Id. at 273.
328. Id. at 261 (Barbados); and id. at 270 (Mali).
329. For example, the Committee requested what consideration the governments of
Mali, id. at 270; Tanzania, id. at 266; Norway, id. at 282; and Jamaica, id. at 273, had
given to the possible abolition of the death penalty. The Jamaican representative was
asked whether the Jamaican Parliament had made progress in considering legislation
which would have abolished the death penalty. Id. Furthermore, the Committee re-
quested information about the circumstances in which the Governor General could exer-
cise the prerogative of commuting a sentence. Moreover, in response to a Committee
request for information concerning whether the death penalty had been abolished in
Norway, the Norwegian representative stated that public opinion was deeply split on the
abolition of the death penalty and that its abolition had just barely passed in
Parliament.
330. For instance, the Tanzanian representative was asked for information about
the number of death sentences that had been commuted following the adoption of the
Covenant. Id. at 266.
331. Id. at 270 (discussion with state representative of Mali).
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COULD be influenced profoundly by regional practice.
The Sixth Annual Human Rights Committee report raised
some of the same questions as before especially regarding capital
punishment, infant mortality, and abortion. 2
Further, the Coinmittee explored some noteworthy new is-
sues reflecting the evolution of the scope of Article 6. Thus,
Committee members asked for information concerning the eco-
nomic, social and administrative measures taken to ensure the
quality of life, protect workers' health,333 safeguard the environ-
ment, and regulate food and pharmaceutical products.3 3 4 Com-
mittee members were also concerned about national drug abuse
policy. Accordingly, they questioned the Netherlands' state rep-
resentative regarding Dutch legislation which seemed lenient,
and perhaps conflicted with the aim of protecting the right to
life.3
The Committee reaffirmed that Article 6 requires states to
take "affirmative action" to protect human beings against
crimes, epidemics and infant mortality. 336 Moreover, the Com-
mittee continued pressing for information regarding the rules
concerning the use of force by police and security forces.3 37 For
example, the Committee asked about Guyana's investigation of
the mass deaths occurring at Jonestown, as well as the assassina-
tion of a leading political activist and scholar (Walter
Rodney).
332. For example, one state's (Japan) representative said that a large majority of
citizens favored retaining the death penalty and accordingly, its abolition was not con-
templated. Id. at 342. Part of the reason for continued public support for capital punish-
ment seemed to be the existence of recurrent brutal crimes. Id. at 342. On the other
hand, the Committee noted with approval that the Netherlands intended to abolish the
death penalty. Id. at 344.
See also the Committee questions to the Moroccan representative regarding the cir-
cumstances in which the death penalty could be applied for "crimes against the internal
and external security of the state," and the fact of the death penalty still being allowed
for persons below 18 years of age, and for pregnant women who had given birth forty
days prior to the imposition of the penalty. Id. at 350.
Similarly, regarding infant mortality, the Committee expressed continuing concerns
about comparative rates of infant mortality in metropolitan and dependent territories.
Thus, in regard to Committee inquiries the Dutch representative said that the infant
mortality rate in the Netherlands was 8.6 per 1,000 in 1980 compared with 15.5 per 1,000
in 1979 in the Netherlands Antilles. Id. at 347.
333. Id. at 339 (inquiries raised in response to Japan's report).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 344.
336. Id. at 360 (response to Rwanda's report).
337. Id. at 364 (Guyana's report).
338. Id.
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Committee attention also focused on whether capital trials
were conducted with procedural safeguards contemplated by the
Covenant,33 and whether the death penalty had been imposed
for charges such as "war on God" and "war on God's
property.
'34°
In addition, the Human Rights Committee in its general
comments following the sixth report interpreted Article 6
broadly. Committee general comment 6(16) stated that Article 6
applies to curbing war, state violence, disappearances and poor
health conditions.3 41 This interpretation was built in part upon
Committee questions during the first six years of its reports.
Such questions involved steps that individual states had taken
to protect human life in areas including health care, environ-
mental protection, reduction of infant mortality, and even work-
ing conditions. The Committee "linked" protecting life under
penal statutes and through governmental social and economic
policy.
Moreover, the Committee made it plain that Article 6 was
directed towards the eventual abolition of the death penalty.
For example, the Committee annual reports repeatedly mani-
fested concern with gathering information involving what states
are doing to abolish the death 'penalty.342 In a similar vien, the
Committee sought information concerning the circumstances in
which the death penalty is imposed upon individuals under eigh-
teen or pregnant women. The Committee also raised the "cross-
over" issue of national laws affecting genocide.
In short, the first six years of the Committee practice indi-
cate that the right to life was given a general (and perhaps gen-
erous!) interpretation.
The seventh annual report of the Human Rights Committee
demonstrated continued concern involving capital punishment
imposition, reducing infant mortality, regulating abortion, limit-
ing governmental firearm use against civilians, and curbing
disappearances.
More specifically, the Committee asked what were the
''grave military offenses" and "highway robbery" to which the
339. Id. at 371-72 (report of Iran).
340. Id. at 372.
341. Id. at 382-83.
342. See, e.g., reports of Soviet Union, YEARBOOK (77-78), supra note 287, at 285;
Mauritius, YEARBOOK (77-78), supra note 287, at 289; Senegal, YEARBOOK (79-80), supra
note 15, at 556; and Morocco, YEARBOOK (81-82), supra note 322, at 350.
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death penalty could be imposed,343 what was meant by the asser-
tion that a person's life could be taken by "necessity," and
whether such necessity might include abortion and euthana-
sia. 3"" Furthermore, the large gap in life expectancy between ab-
original and settler populations drew continuing Committee at-
tention. In one case (Australia), Committee members pointed
out that the infant mortality rate was three times higher for the
aboriginal population. 345 In another case, Committee members
requested information concerning the measures that the French
had taken to reduce infant mortality both in metropolitan
France and in the territories. 46
Regarding abortion, questions were asked concerning the se-
verity of penalties for violating abortion law, 47 the legislative
protection of fetuses, 348 and applicable provisions involving "vol-
untary abortion.
'3 49
Similarly, as to states' use of arms against their civilians,
Committee members inquired concerning deaths of Miskito In-
dians in Nicaragua,35 ° Peruvian regulation of force by govern-
mental or police agencies, 51 and the use of force by French se-
curity forces and police. 52
The Committee also queried concerning the jurisdiction of
civilian versus military courts in cases involving "treason in a
foreign war."3 53
In keeping with the Committee's longstanding concern
about protecting human life through social and humanitarian
law, the Committee requested information regarding steps taken
to meet people's need for food, improved public health and gen-
eral standards of living.3 54 Furthermore, Committee members re-
quested information concerning what measures had been taken
to protect individuals from criminality and to check both rising
delinquency and unemployment. The Committee considered
343. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/38/40
(1983) (Mexico's Report).
344. Id. at 22 (Iceland's report),
345. Id. at 29.
346. Id. at 71.
347. Id. at 29 (Committee questions involving Australia's report).
348. Id. at 41 (Austria's report).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 50.
351. Id. at 61.
352. Id. at 71.
353. Id. at 61.
354. Id.
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these phenomena as threats to the lives of both families and
individuals. 55
The Committee also confronted the extraordinarily complex
and tragic human situation reflected in conditions existing
among the hapless inhabitants of Lebanon. The Committee
faced a number of dilemmas. One was that the Lebanese report
did not reflect the state of affairs of Lebanon; the government
did not have control over much of the country.
35
The Committee raised questions concerning the massacres
in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra, and Shatila,35 7 steps
taken to protect the lives of Palestinians and Lebanese citizens
who had been kidnapped or who had disappeared, the continued
existence of a tradition of "vendetta" to protect family honor,35 8
and limitations placed on the use of armed force by the police
and security forces.359
The eighth annual report of the Human Rights Committee
included for the first time several second periodic reports. The
second periodic reports were an update on the progress which
nations had made after filing their first report. The second re-
ports included information concerning the specific implementa-
tion of various provisions of the ICCPR.360 The eighth report
witnessed the Committee's continued questions involving capital
punishment, abortion, governmental violence against civilians,
and improving public health. 6'
355. Id. at 71 (France's report).
356. Id. at 79.
357. Id. at 81.
358. Id. at 82.
359. Id.
360. Yugoslavia had the distinction of being the first nation to file a second periodic
report. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 48, U.N. Doe. A/39/
40 (1984) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/39/40]. The Yugoslav delegation had agreed to an
"experiment" suggested by the Human Rights Committee, whereby there was an ex-
change of questions and answers between the Committee and the Yugoslav delegation
before the official meetings. This helped facilitate the discussion at the meetings. Id. at
48.
361. Thus for example, the Committee requested information involving the fre-
quency of capital punishment imposition under Indian law, id. at 50, the high infant
mortality rate in rural areas, and whether the government had planned to extend medi-
cal care to such areas. Id. Further information concerning Indian police use of firearms
and prosecution for improper use of such firearms was requested. Id.
Similarly, in examining the first report of Egypt, the Committee noted with regret
that measures had not been taken to abolish capital punishment. Id. at 56. In addition,
members of the Committee requested, information concerning life expectancy and infant
mortality. Id.
Likewise, Committee members requested information concerning whether the Gain-
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READER: What about further developments in the evolving in-
terpretation of Article 6?
WRITER: One example is the Committee acknowledgement
that social, economic and political forces all impacted the pro-
tection of human rights including the right to life. Accordingly, a
different method had to be used in approaching the Salvadorian
situation. In that regard, the Committee requested information
concerning the tremendous number of civilians killed in the Sal-
vadorian civil War and whether the mass killings reflected gov-
ernment policy.3 62 In addition, the Committee asked whether the
government had effectively investigated and prosecuted individ-
uals (including security forces) responsible for taking lives.
Questions were also raised concerning the precise fiumber of in-
dividuals who had disappeared and whether individuals under
sixteen years of age could be the victims of capital
punishment.
3 63
Another noteworthy case reflecting Committee concerns in-
volved Sri Lanka. Issues raised included government protection
of children from epidemics and hunger, the reduction of people
killed during "intercommunal clashes," and police regulations
allowing police to take possession of bodies, and bury and cre-
mate them without witnesses.
3 64
Further, the Committee requested comparative information
about infant mortality among ethnic communities like the
Maoris of New Zealand. 65 This question reflected the Commit-
tee's continuing concerns involving protecting minority group
members' lives in diverse societies.
Furthermore, members wanted to know what was being
done to alleviate the continuing tragedy of immolation and self-
immolation, particularly among young Islamic women in India
who are unable to pay a required marital dowery
3 66
The Committee also raised a constitutional law "checks and
balances" question regarding the relationship between an inde-
pendent Gambian judiciary and an executive branch with the
bian authorities had considered the abolition of the death penalty, id. at 61, data involv-
ing infant birth and death rates and what was being done to improve life expectancy in
the villages. Id. at 61-62. Finally, a question was asked concerning the legality of abor-
tion in Gambia.
362. Id. at 14.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 22.
365. Id. at 34.
366. Id. at 50.
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perogative to commute death sentences. 6
In the context of the Democratic People's Republic of Ko-
rea initial report, the Committee sought further clarification re-
garding what was meant by "international murder."3' 6 8
A Committee member also requested information concern-
ing Panamanian agricultural development plans because Article
6 also involved the elimination of hunger and malnutrition.
3 6
In reviewing additional information submitted by the Re-
public of Chile, the Committee asked whether links existed be-
tween non-official groups of citizens and the public authorities.
Such citizens sometimes claimed to be assistants of the police in
maintaining law and order.3 70 The Committee also asked about
numerous other issues including legislation to protect the lives
of mine workers, information on public health and government
measures to reduce unemployment.
3 7 1
In a rather dramatic development...
READER: Dramatic?!
WRITER: Yes, I would say "dramatic development," the Com-
mittee asked the representative of the former German Demo-
cratic Republic (G.D.R.) about his country's attitude toward nu-
clear disarmament in Europe.37 12 Accordingly, the Committee
had raised, apparently for the first time in an annual report, the
question of nuclear disarmament as an important aspect of the
protection of the right to life. This question probably flowed
from the Committee's adoption approximately a year and a half
before of general comment 6(16). s 3 The Committee also re-
quested information about the G.D.R. position concerning the
so-called "principle of unilateral renunciation of military
force. "37
In an interesting reply, the G.D.R. representative asserted:
that the right to life and the right to peace were inextricably
linked; that the death penalty was imposed only in circum-
stances of very serious crimes, and then only rarely; and that to
preserve peace and save millions of lives from nuclear war, the
367. Id. at 61.
368. Id. at 69.
369. Id. at 74.
370. Id. at 84.
371. Id. at 84-86.
372. Id. at 94-95.
373. YEARBooK (81-82), supra note 322, at 382-83.
374. U.N. Doc. A/39/40, supra note 360, at 95.
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death penalty was excusable.37 5
Moreover, in comments that suggest the issues of euthana-
sia and organ transplantation had been broached, the G.D.R.
representative said that legislation proscribed active assistance
in ending a person's life and provided for the punishment of
medical personnel who actively participated. The G.D.R. had de-
veloped a practice regarding organ transplants which required
the consent of both parties and their relatives; however, no legis-
lation regulating such transplanting existed.37 6
At the beginning of its deliberations for the ninth annual
reporting period, the Human Rights Committee issued another
general comment on the right to life. General comment 14(23)
noted that "weapons of mass destruction" threaten human life,
drained vital resources from crucial "economic and social pur-
poses" and fostered fear and suspicion among states. Accord-
ingly, the Committee called for a ban on the "production, test-
ing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
378
General comment 14(23) provoked intense discussion within
the United Nation's Third Committee regarding protecting
life.37  Nevertheless, within the Human Rights Committee,
members seemed convinced it was within their Committee's
mandate to appeal to states acceding to the ICCPR for a nuclear
weapons ban. Such a ban would preserve human life.380 How-
ever, some Committee members seemed to feel that their man-
date did not extend to discussing details of removing threats of
war.
381
The Human Rights Committee also considered recurrent
themes involving types of capital offenses, the infant mortality
rate, the regulation and investigation of firearm use by police,
the likelihood of abolishing the death penalty,3 82 abortion and
375. U.N. Doc. A/39/40, supra note 360, at 95.
376. U.N. Doc. A/39/40, supra note 360, at 96.
377. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 162, U.N. Doc. A/
40/40 (1985).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 6.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. For instance, one state representative (Trinidad and Tobago) stated that a
lively debate existed with regard to the abolition of the death penalty; and that the
government was seeking a broader consensus. Id. at 22.
Similarly, Committee members requested information regarding whether Afghani-
stan was inclined to abolish capital punishment, the frequency with which it was im-
posed, and statistics including how many death sentences had been executed, and the
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disappearances of human beings.383
Committee members seemed especially interested in states'
views on the Committee's published general comments about the
scope of Article 6.384 Responding to Committee members' re-
quests for information regarding the Soviet Union's perspective,
the Soviet representative stated that their delegation "welcomed
and fully supported" the Committee's general comments regard-
ing the scope of Article 6. The Soviet Union sanctioned the view
that preventing war, acts of genocide and other acts of "mass
destruction," were the highest duties of the state.
3 15
In contrast, when the Committee inquired concerning "posi-
tive measures" that the United Kingdom may have taken to
avert the "danger of thermonuclear war, ' '38 6 the representative
said that his government greatly respected the Committee's po-
sition on the general interpretation of Article 6. Nevertheless,
the government "did not necessarily agree wholeheartedly" with
all that the Committee had said.387 Further, the representative
said that in his opinion the proper forum to discuss disarma-
ment was not the Human Rights Committee; however, his gov-
ernment's allegiance to protecting human rights and especially
the right to life, was firm. 8
Accordingly, it seemed that ideological differences between
free market and (state) socialist nations may have effected their
"official" views on nuclear disarmament and on the interpreta-
tive scope of Article 6.
number of people who had been pardoned. The Committee also wanted to know what
were the "unforgiveable crimes" for which death might be imposed. Id. at 119. Commit-
tee members sought information regarding whether the court could impose the death
penalty, the appellate process, and what government mechanisms were available to in-
vestigate alleged arbitrary killings. Id.
383. For example, in the Dominican Republic's report, Committee members noted
their concern about the disappearance of a number of individuals and requested follow-
up information about investigations of alleged disappearances. Id. at 73. Committee
questions also focused on alleged police excessive use of force; and whether such use had
been investigated and the results of the investigation. In addition, information concern-
ing the growth rate of the Dominican Republic's population, as well as its infant mortal-
ity rate, was solicited. Committee members also wanted to know whether abortion was
legal. Id.
384. See, e.g., Committee questions posed to the Soviet Union. Id. at 50.
385. Id. Likewise, when asked for reactions to the Committee's general comments on
Article 6, id. at 127, the Ukranian representative said that his government fully sup-
ported the views of the Committee in its general comments 6(16) and 14(23). Id. at 128.





In an interesting remark, one Committee member pointed
out that a connection existed between the need to prevent ther-
monuclear war and the adoption of laws prohibiting "propa-
ganda for war" under Article 20 of the ICCPR.3 89 Thus the de-
velopment of Article 6 seemed inevitably to "push" it into the
"territory" of other articles of the ICCPR. In so doing the Com-
mittee continued a trend of interpreting Article 6 as a vital part
of an "organically" whole doument. The ICCPR is organically
whole in the sense that it fits together in an organized manner
for the common purpose of protecting human beings.
In another development involving protecting the right to
life in the context of civil wars, the Afghan representative was
asked whether his government shared the view that the "sub-
stance" of Article 6 was reflected in the 1949 Geneva Convention
and Additional Protocol No. II concerning "minimum guaran-
tees in armed conflict not of an international character." 390 In
addition, Committee members wanted to know whether foreign
troops in Afghanistan complied with the state's obligation under
the ICCPR.3 91
During the tenth annual reporting period, Committee mem-
bers continued their quest for governmental responses to pro-
tecting life in light of general comments 6(16) and 14(23).392 For
example, in response to Committee questions, Luxembourg's
representative said that Luxembourg neither possessed nor man-
ufactured nuclear armaments 93 and that Luxembourg had
signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
3 9 4
Likewise, many Committee members asked what practical
steps Sweden had taken regarding the Committee's general com-
ments 6(16) and 14(23).395 Replying to the Committee questions,
the Swedish representative said, among other things, that Swe-
den had conducted a national study on disarmament and devel-
opment focusing on the social and economic effects of converting
from military to civilian production. 96
The Finnish representative stated in response to similar
389. Id.
390. Id. at 119.
391. Id.
392. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 41st Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 8, U.N. Doc.
A/41/40 (1985).
393. Id. at 16.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 24.
396. Id.
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questions that Finnish legislation was not inconsistent with ei-
ther general comment 6(16) or 14(23).117
On a different note, Committee members indicated their re-
gret that the Federal Republic of Germany's Government had
seemed to disregard the Committee's general comment 6(16) and
14(23). The German representative commented that his govern-
ment could agree with the Committee's general comment 6(16)
as far as that comment involved preventing war. 98 The repre-
sentative said that his government viewed the Committee's gen-
eral comment 14(23) as a deviation from the Committee's "man-
date. 3' 99 The questions involved under comment 14(23) fell
within the "competence" of other international or United Na-
tions bodies.
400
At the conclusion of the German report, Committee mem-
bers rejected the German government's interpretation of the le-
gitimate scope of the Committee's inquiry.40 1 The Committee's
view was that the German government had adopted a "principle
of lex generalis and lex specialis." That principle, as applied by
the German government, was that the Committee ought not to
involve itself in the details of preventing nuclear war. The Ger-
man government's position seemed to be that other interna-
tional documents covered such issues.0 2 The Committee said
that it adopted the general comments to avoid attempts to nar-
rowly interpret the right to life.403
In contrast to the German response, the Czechoslovak rep-
resentative asserted that his government supported the conclu-
sions that the Committee made in its general comments 6(16)
and 14(23). Czechoslovakia believed that the production, testing,
possession and deployment of nuclear weapons constituted
"crimes against humanity."'404
Another interesting case involved possible "conflict" of in-
ternational and domestic laws. In response to Committee con-
cerns, Luxembourg's representative said that the death penalty
could not be reintroduced in his country after the Sixth Protocol
397. Id. at 38.
398. Id. at 61.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 70.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 74.
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to the European Convention on Human Rights had been
adopted. This was because international norms had primacy
over national ones.405
In a different context, a rather novel question arose involv-
ing state policy affecting the sentencing of insane people.40 6 In
response to Committee concerns, the Mongolian representative
indicated that those who committed "socially dangerous acts,"
but who lacked mental capacity, were subject to compulsory
psychiatric intervention.40 7
In addition, on a different topic, at least one Committee
member thought that the Mongolian governmental statutes
might be inconsistent with Article 6 paragraph two of the Cove-
nant because offenses for misappropriation "or theft of prop-
erty" could result in capital punishment.40 8
Moreover, one governmental response reflected the in-
creased "linkages" that the Committee developed between the
protection of the right to life and the right to freedom from tor-
ture. In Finland's second periodic report, the state representa-
tive noted in the context of police abuse issues that torture was
a criminal offense.409
As in previous reports, the Committee requested nations to
furnish information concerning the criminal offenses for which
the death penalty could be imposed and the frequency with
which it had been carried out,41 0 governmental education efforts
to reduce crimes involving drugs, infant mortality rate informa-
tion, and the consequences of police officers killing civilians.
411
Furthermore, Committee members asked questions involv-
ing how police had been trained to treat prisoners and whether
environmental pollution was "punishable.
'41 2
The eleventh annual reporting period witnessed the Com-
mittee's continued evolution of the scope and meaning of Article
6. Committee attention embraced the familiar issues involving
capital punishment, abortion, regulation of governmental deadly
405. Id. at 16.
406. This question arose in the context of Mongolia's second periodic report. Id. at
49-50.
407. Id. at 50.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 38-39.
410. Id. at 86 (questions posed during Hungary's second periodic report).
411. Id. at 60 (inquiries made in context of Federal Republic of Germany's second
periodic report).
412. Id. at 38 (Finland's second periodic report).
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force against civilians, disappearances, and improving public
health. For instance, the Committee asked the representative of
Tunisia concerning what had Tunisia done to reduce infant mor-
tality, the number of state sanctioned executions since 1985, and
whether persons who obtained or helped in the obtaining of
abortions could be punished under Tunisian law.413 Some Com-
mittee members wanted to know the state's position regarding
whether life existed from conception or from birth and, if from
conception, then whether aborted fetuses were free from medical
experimentation.4 14 Questions were also asked concerning the
number of people whom security forces had killed during
demonstrations.
15
Attention was drawn to Committee general comment 6(16)
stressing that the wording of Article 6 "strongly suggested" that
states should abolish the death penalty.416
In addition, there were some new "variations" on the usual
"themes." Some of the more notable ones follow.
In one rather remarkable exchange, again involving Tunisia,
the state representative acknowledged that with the increased
emancipation of women, violence against them had also acceler-
ated. The government had imposed the death penalty in cases of
rape as a deterrent.1 Thus, to protect a social value involving
equality, the Tunisian government asserted that capital punish-
ment was in effect a shield. Capital punishment protected soci-
ety's (more important?) interests.
Furthermore, the Committee continued to see the rights to
life and freedom from torture as interrelated. In response to a
right to life related query, the Tunisian representative said that
governmental officials who were guilty of torture had been sen-
tenced to hard labor.41 8 Interestingly, the representative asserted
that members of the security forces were given a special course
involving human rights legislation.419
Committee attention also focused on a state's action to es-
tablish independent investigatory bodies to help curb and pun-
413. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/42/40
(1987).
414. Id. at 30-31.
415. Id. at 31.
416. Id.





ish the perpetration of high levels of political violence (e.g., dis-
appearances and assassinations).42 °
In another case (Congo), the Committee asked for further
information regarding the circumstances required for an individ-
ual under the age of sixteen to be "acquitted and handed over to
his parents." Committee members also sought information con-
cerning how responsibility for correcting the child was trans-
ferred to the parents and what the practice of the Congolese
courts was.421
The Committee also confronted a situation (Iraq) involving
a long list of offenses for which the death penalty could be im-
posed. Committee members requested clarification regarding
what constituted political offenses subjecting individuals to
death, the frequency of the penalty's imposition over the past
seven years, and whether individuals could be put to death for
insulting the Iraqi President under aggravating circumstances.422
Committee members were also concerned by possible retroactive
death penalty legislation.423
The twelfth annual Human Rights Committee report in-
volved many of the issues previously discussed and a few more
"developments." For instance, the Committee continued press-
ing for information concerning the measures taken to prevent
epidemics and to reduce infant mortality42 4 and how police were
regulated in their use of firearms.425 In addition, the Committee
asked a number of nations their responses to the Committee
420. These concerns were raised in the context of El Salvador's supplementary re-
port. Id. at 42.
421. Id. at 61.
422. These issues flowed from the circumstances surrounding Iraq's second periodic
report. Id. at 91.
423. Id. at 92.
424. For example, the Committee asked for information involving measures taken to
reduce the Ecuadorian infant mortality rate and to expand health services for women
and children. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 74, U.N. Doc.
A/43/40 (1988) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/43/40]. Similarly, the Committee wanted to
know what was the latest information regarding Belgium measures taken to increase life
expectancy, reduce infant mortality, deter epidemics, and counter malnutrition. Id. at
111.
425. Questions of this nature arose in Denmark's second periodic report. Id. at 36-
37. Similarly, questions were raised regarding Columbia's regulation of police and secur-
ity forces' use of firearms and whether or not, if violations had occurred, steps had been
taken to prevent their recurrence. Id. at 122. Likewise, the Committee sought informa-
tion on the Barbadoan regulation of police use of firearms and whether the government
investigated and prosecuted individuals who had violated the regulations. Id. at 131.
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general comments: Trinidad and Tobago,426  Denmark,
427
Rwanda,'42 Ecuador,429 Barbados, 430 and Japan.431
Venturing into somewhat less well trod territory, the Com-
mittee inquired whether a government (Trinidad and Tobago)
was planning to develop special courses for law enforcement per-
sonnel to help prevent abuse of authority.
43 2
The Committee members also seemed concerned by the
length of time that people in a number of countries spent on
death row. For instance, in evaluating Rwanda's second periodic
report, the Committee asked for information involving how long
some individuals had been on Death Row, and why such a large
number of death sentences existed given the improved law and
order situation in the country.433
In one interesting case, Committee members also asked
whether individuals between the ages of thirteen and eighteen
could be executed. This question arose following a comment in
the Guinean report which indicated that youngsters under the
age of thirteen could not be executed.43'
In another case (Central African Republic) involving capital
punishment, some members noted that the death penalty
seemed to apply to cases involving unlawful arrests or detention
and that if that were the case, the punishment was dispropor-
tionate to the crime.
435
Questions continued to arise regarding certain alleged
forced disappearances, 43 6 and assaults associated with para-mili-
tary organizations. Thus, in one case (Colombia), the Committee
requested information involving general comment 6(16), espe-
cially paragraph four relating to the disappearance of individu-
als, and general comment 14(23). 3
426. Id. at 15.
427. Id. at 36.
428. Id. at 50.
429. Id. at 74.
430. Id. at 131.
431. Id. at 141.
432. Id. at 15.
433. Id. at 50. Similar questions were asked of Japan, Id. at 141.
434. Id. at 59.
435. Id. at 65.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 122. In addition, information was requested involving measures taken to
combat the so-called "death squads" 'and other private vigilante groups. Id. Members
wanted to know what the government planned to do to combat the problem of involun-
tary disappearances, especially the steps being taken to deal with missing individuals, Id.
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In a rather frank dialogue, Committee members requested
information regarding France's response to the Committee's gen-
eral comments 6(16) and 14(23). The French representative as-
serted the right of his nation to defend itself and claimed that
its nuclear arsenal was for deterrent purposes. 438 He also said
that only when disarmament had been achieved would requests
for the banning of nuclear tests be "significant."439
In addition, information was asked about the infant mortal-
ity rate in France, as well as its overseas territories and depart-
ments.440 Further, the Committee asked for information con-
cerning whether different regulations applied to regular police
activities versus police anti-terrorist responses.
441
Committee members encountered a different reponse when
they asked for Australia's views on Committee general com-
ments 6(16) and 14(23). The Australian representative said that
his country supported a comprehensive test ban on nuclear
weapons and global nuclear disarmament. 442 His government's
armed forces were defensive in nature and Australia had sup-
ported the declaration of the South Pacific as a nuclear free zone
in 1985.
As in the French case, the Committee requested similar in-
formation concerning the infant mortality rate of the Aboriginal
population as compared with the rest of the Australian populus.
This was a follow-up query from Australia's first periodic
report.
443
In an intriguing line of questioning, Committee members
sought clarification regarding the overlap of Aboriginal custom-
ary law with Australian criminal law; and whether the Aborigi-
nal population was exposed to double jeopardy.
444
Regarding the continuing capital punishment dilemma,
Committee members asked one state (Belgium) representative
whether minors over sixteen could receive the death penalty.
The representative said that since the death penalty was not
carried out in Belgium, it had not been contemplated to repeal
the provisions affectinig minors who were over the age of




442. Id. at 100.
443. See supra notes 343-46 and accompanying text.
444. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 100.
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sixteen.445
Some Committee members requested information involving
whether the armed forces of Colombia applied the 1949 Geneva
Convention when fighting against guerilla groups. Questions
were raised concerning how human rights could be protected
given the pervasive violence in the Colombian society.446
In a different vein, a question was raised whether a doctor
in Columbia could be found guilty of a crime for ordering an
abortion to save the mother's life.447 The Colombian representa-
tive said that for cultural reasons, in part involving Catholicism,
individuals who procured an abortion still were guilty of a
crime.448 Thus, Committee members confronted the reality of
culture and religion's frequent pervasive effects on law.449
In a response similar to Tunisia's during the previous an-
nual reporting period,45 0 the Columbian representative also said
that an educational campaign to sensitize the police and soldiers
to human rights concerns had been conducted.451
The overviews of the first twelve annual reports demon-
strate that the Committee interpreted Article 6 broadly. The
thirteenth annual Human Rights Committee report followed
those precedents.
Accordingly, in addition to the "standard" questions involv-
ing capital punishment,452 abortion, 45 3 infant mortality,4 4 gov-
445. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 116.
446. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 122-23.
447. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 123.
448. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 123.
449. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 123.
450. See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
451. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, supra note 424, at 124.
452. Committee members asked for information involving the possibility of the
Mexican government abolishing the death penalty since it was not used anymore. U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
Similarly, members of the Committee asked whether the United Kingdom had consid-
ered abolishing capital punishment in any of the dependent territories. Id. at 36. Mem-
bers also wanted to know whether the government had decided to abolish the death
penalty for treason in New Zealand. Id. at 86.
In addition, the Committee questioned the Bolivian representative regarding the cir-
cumstances in which capital punishment could be imposed, the meaning of the term
"homicide committed . . . for motives of honor," the definition of political offenses, and
the identity of the authorities who could grant amnesty for political offenses. Id. at 95.
In the case of Cameroon, Committee members asked for which crimes a person
could be sentenced to death in the Cameroon, the applicability of the death penalty to
minors, and the number of persons on death row. In addition, they asked the number of
executions that had been commuted and the number that had been carried out in recent
years. Id. at 104. The Committee requested further information involving the president's
criteria for exercising a pardon.
453. For example, Committee members asked the Uruguayan representative
490 -
1992] BRAVE NEW WORLD 491
ernmental violence against civilians,456 and the more recent ther-
monuclear concerns,456 the Committee asked about a number of
interesting "life issues." For example, the question was raised
regarding whether Norway planned measures to regulate the
transportion and dumping of poisonous waste.457 Similar ques-
tions were raised involving the steps Italy had taken to prevent
toxic waste dumping.
45
Furthermore, Mexico's representative was questioned re-
whether abortion was legal under any circumstances. Id. at 66.
Similarly, Members also wanted to know what Bolivian legislative enactments af-
fected abortion. Id. at 95.
Regarding the status of Italian law affecting abortion, Committee members asked
whether the fetus was considered a human being having the inherent right to life, the
circumstances in which a fetus could be aborted on the grounds that she might suffer an
abnormality, and the stage in the pregnancy in which a fetus obtained the status of a
human being with the right to life. Id. at 125. The Italian representative said, in an
interesting reply, that women could freely abort their fetuses during the first ninety days
of pregnancy. Id. at 126. However, such individuals had to inform their physicians of the
reason for the decision. Following the ninety days, abortions could be performed only if
the mother's life was seriously endangered or if there were serious pathological abnor-
malities reflected in an examination of the mother. Physicians were not required to assist
with abortions because of the large degree of public opposition to it. Id. The representa-
tive said that the law did not decide at what point a fetus became a human being.
454. Id. at 24 (Mexico); id. at 65 (Uruguay); id. at 86 (New Zealand).
455. For instance, members asked what were the rules governing Mexican police use
of firearms, whether those rules had been violated, and if so, what measures had been
taken to prevent future violations. In addition, some members asked whether alleged
disappearances and deaths at the hands of the police or security forces had occurred
during the reporting period, and if so, whether such accusations had been investigated
and for the results of the investigation'. Id. at 24.
In another context, questions were asked involving the Mauritian police's use of so-
phisticated firearms; and whether citizens could carry firearms to protect themselves. Id.
at 113. In yet another case, the Committee asked about the nature of Italy's rules appli-
cable to police and security forces' use of firearms; and what, if any, violations of the
police and security force regulations involving firearms existed. Id. at 125.
456. For example, the Norwegian representative stated that Norway supported a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty vis a vis the Committee's general comments 6(16)
and 14(23). Id. at 14-15.
Similarly, the New Zealand representative noted that his government supported a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Further, under the New Zealand Nuclear Free
Zone and Disarmament and Army Control Act of 1987, New Zealand had banned nuclear
weapons from its territory. Id. at 86.
Likewise, the Italian representative said that Italy had adopted a number of non-
proliferation treaties and that it did not stockpile nuclear weapons. Id. at 125. He also
stated that his country did not have nuclear weapon bases, and that countries with
weapons on Italian soil could not use them without first obtaining Italian governmental
permission. Id.
457. Id. at 14.
458. Id. at 125.
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garding steps taken to curb death flowing from conflicts over
land, clarification of why so many journalists seemed to have
died mysteriously,49 the regulation of new techniques for artifi-
cial fertilization, and the detention and murder of indigenous
peoples and peasants.46 °
A Committee member also asked the state representative of
one nation (the Netherlands) whether the right to life provision
of the Covenant was being considered in the context of an ongo-
ing debate regarding euthanasia.6 1
The Committee again drew the connection between the
right to life and the right to freedom from torture as it asked the
Uruguayan representative whether individuals had died recently
due to police or military torture.46 2
Regarding the related issues of "disappearances" of individ-
uals and government agents' abuse of civilians, the Committee
asked questions involving disappearances flowing from illegal ac-
tivities of Phillipines armed forces police and vigilantes.
463
In a different area, Committee members asked the Phil-
lipines representative whether a simple ban upon parents who
killed their minor daughters or lovers caught in the sexual act
was "overly lenient.
'4 64
Committee members asked several reporting states about
the infant mortality rates of individuals from minority ethnic
groups vis a vis the majority population. Thus, for example, the
question was raised regarding why the infant mortality rate was
about twice as high among the Maori population of New Zealand
as compared to other groups.
465
In addition, information was requested concerning the com-
prehensive accident compensation scheme that New Zealand
had mentioned in its report.
459. Id. at 24.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 47.
462. Id. at 65.
463. Id. at 73. Similar questions were asked in the Uruguayan context regarding the
status of fifty-six alleged unresolved disappearances. Id. at 65-66. In addition, members
sought information regarding alleged disappearances in Bolivia and the part that the
National Commission for Investigation of Disappearances played vis a vis such disap-
pearances. Id. at 95.
464. Id. at 73.
465. Id. at 86. Similarly, the Committee sought information regarding the infant
mortality rate among the general population versus smaller ethnic groups within the
Mexican population. Id. at 24. And in yet another context, information was requested
regarding comparative infant mortality rates in the Netherlands and Aruba. Id. at 47.
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In one case (Cameroon), Committee members asked why
the mother was more severely punished for abortion than others
who were involved and what limitations were placed on the abil-
ity of women to obtain abortions.466
In a capital punishment related query, the Committee asked
the Togolese representative about the meaning of the terms "of-
fense against morality" and "action threatening the external or
domestic security of the state."46 7 Similarly, in another case, the
Committee expressed concern regarding the decision of Mauri-
tius to reintroduce the death penalty for drug traffickers follow-
ing a twenty-three year moratorium.
4 68
Committee members also sought information involving
whether deaths had occurred in Italian prisons. Moreover, ap-
parently the Committee asked a question involving in vitro fer-
tilization for the Italian representative said that the use and
preservation of human embryos was prohibited under Italian law
and accordingly the status of embryos resulting from in vitro
fertilization was not a legal question that had arisen in his
country.
4 69
It may also interest you to know that on December 15, 1989
the United Nations General Assembly adopted a proposed "Sec-
ond Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Pen-
alty.' ' 470 The Second Optional Protocol entered into force on
July 11, 1991; and affects over a dozen nations that ratified it.
47 1
466. Id. at 104.
467. Id. at 55.
468. Id. at 113. Using the death penalty for the sale and consumption of "un-
processed coca leaves," and issues of procedural fairness, in those circumstances troubled
some Committee members. Id.
469. Id. at 126.
470. See Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, entered into force July 11,
1991, U.N. Doc. AIRES/44/128 (1989) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol].
471. U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, Supp., U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9.
The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR tries to abolish the death penalty in
states which have ratified the protocol. See Second Optional Protocol, supra note 470.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the protocol states that "[n]o one within the jurisdiction of a
State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed." Second Optional Protocol, supra
note 470, art. 1. In addition, that article provides that each state must take all necessary
steps to abolish the death penalty within its borders. Second Optional Protocol, supra
note 470, art. 1(2). The Second Optional Protocol is made specifically subject to a "no
reservation" provision. That is, under Article 2 of the protocol, that ratifying states may
not take a reservation to the protocol except for application of the death penalty in war
time "pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military nature." Second
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE'S INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN LIGHT OF CONCERNS OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
During the first thirteen years of its annual reports, the
Human Rights Committee has interpreted the right to life to en-
compass a number of issues. Those issues involve capital punish-
ment, infant mortality, working conditions, toxic waste dump-
ing, nuclear proliferation, prevention of war, police and military
use of force against civilians, the enhancement of human life ex-
pectancy, abortion and numerous other concerns. Each issue is,
however, related to preserving and enhancing human life.472
In addition, the Human Rights Committee has issued two
general comments on the protection of the right to life, specifi-
cally general comment 14(23) and general comment 6(16). Those
general comments affirm that the protection of the right to life
goes beyond merely carefully circumscribing the circumstances
in which the death penalty may be applied. In fact, the right to
life encompasses freedom from "war and other acts of mass vio-
lence" and involves the obligation of states to take measures to
enhance the prospects of life through reducing infant mortality
and increasing life expectancy. 473 In addition, general comment
14(23) embraced the abolition of the use and possession of nu-
clear weapons. That comment marked a further development of
Committee understanding regarding the meaning of protecting
the right to life.4
The Committee questions and general comments regarding
the right to life indicate that the Committee took seriously the
general legislative history of the ICCPR.
READER: That is your point of view; but don't you think they
went too far?'
WRITER: Perhaps in a few instances, but generally not. Re-
member, the ICCPR began as part of a general international bill
of rights. For political and historical reasons, that bill of rights
was divided into two. 475 Nevertheless, when the ICCPR and the
Optional Protocol, supra note 470, art. 2. Thus the Second Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR recognizes the continuing trend in international human rights law toward the
abolition of the death penalty - and tries to facilitate that trend.
472. See supra notes 287-469 and accompanying text.
473. YEARBOOK (81-82), supra note 322, at 382.
474. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 162, U.N. Doc. A/
40/40 (1985).
475. INTERNATIONAL BIL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41-43.
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Rights were adopted by the General Assembly, they shared
many provisions identically,47 6 and they were to be interpreted
together.
The general legislative intent of the drafters of the docu-
ment was to provide a wide protection for human rights and
human life. In the drafting process, great defenders of human
freedom like Eleanor Roosevelt explicitly and implicitly champi-
oned the notion that life must receive wide protection.4"7
Having said that, it can be argued that the actual words of
the text suggest a narrower interpretation. Such an interpreta-
tion would focus primarily on the abolition of the death penalty.
Unbridled statutory interpretation based on a so-called "spirit
of the document" can lead to the creation of laws "knowing no
boundary."
However, Article 6 must be viewed in the context of the
ICCPR's overall structure. Moreover, one must bear in mind the
ICCPR's relationship to the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. These documents try to ensure human
survival and freedom. Accordingly, a strong case exists for the
Committee's comprehensive interpretation of Article 6. A my-
opic, narrow and grudging interpretation of the scope of the
right to life would cripple the drafters' general intent to protect
human life. That would be a regrettable result. Surely the bene-
fit of any "doubt" should be resolved in favor of protecting life.
Surely there has been enough death to go around in human
history.
III. EPILOGUE
WRITER: Human rights documents, especially those dealing
with the most precious right of all, the right to life, should be
broadly construed to protect life. Without life, what is there?
READER: Probably not much. But there really is not much we
can really do about it. Human beings are not much good
anyhow.
WRITER: Frankly, I beg to differ on that. I grant we have not
done as much good as we should. But I do take Genesis 1:27
seriously when it states that we are made in the image of God -
476. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41-43.
477. INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 41-43.
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not physically, but spiritually. For we are told that God is spirit,
and they that worship God must do so in spirit and truth.4 8 It is
a great paradox of life that while we have good within, we tend
to do evil.
So in that regard it does matter how we interpret and apply
this statute. As a species, the human race is worth saving and
every little bit helps. That is why I have spent so much of myself
arguing for a "life friendly" interpretive approach. I recognize
that you may argue with the result of this analysis. Nevertheless,
one can learn from the religious context this lesson - namely,
that the letter of the law "killeth." In other words, literalist in-
terpretations can destroy the vitality and the intent of those
who drafted the document.1
7
While the specific intent of some drafters may have been
more narrow, we ought to give force, in this case, to the general
intent. That intent allows the law to become more of a life saver
- a force for progressive human development, rather than a ju-
risprudential "ball and chain" or anchor around our collective
necks.
In closing, we are pushed back, or led forward if you like, to
the interpretive insight from the biblical context that the letter
of the law killeth but the spirit gives life.48 0 Article 6 can, if ap-
propriately interpreted and applied, give life.
478. John 4:24.
479. In the religous context, this point is incisively argued by Bishop John Shelby
Spong in his recent work RESCUING THE BIBLE FROM FUNDAMENTALISM (1991).
480. 2nd Corinthians 3:6 ("[Fjor the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.").
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